New Developments Relating to the Internationalization of the Capital Markets: A Comparison of Legislative Reforms in the United States, The European Community, and Germany by Roquette, Andreas J.
NEW DEVELOPMENTS RELATING TO THE
INTERNATIONALIZATION OF THE
CAPITAL MARKETS:
A COMPARISON OF LEGISLATIVE REFORMS IN THE




1.1. The Internationalization Of The Securities Markets
The internationalization of the world's business activities
has been reflected in the internationalization of securities
markets. This globalization appears in various areas of the
different national securities markets. On the one hand, the
number of foreign investors trading in U.S. securities and U.S.
investors trading in foreign securities has greatly increased.
On the other hand, the number of U.S. corporations issuing
securities abroad as well as the number of securities issued by
foreign corporations and countries in the United States has
grown rapidly. This remarkable expansion includes the
issuance and trading of both debt and equity securities.
Commentators have described the foregoing developments as
"major," "dramatic," "tremendous," and even "revolutionary."1
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The information in this Article is current as of May 31, 1993. Later
developments could only be included in some footnotes.
1 To analyze and describe the extent of the internationalization in the
different market segments in the United States and abroad would go beyond
the scope of this Article. For general statistical information of this kind, see
Globalization of Securities Markets: Hearings Before The Subcomm. on
Telecommunications & Finance of the House Comm. on Energy & Commerce,
100th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1987) (statement of Charles C. Cox, Chairman,
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Distinct national markets have emerged into truly supra-
national trading markets. The Eurobond market is just one
example.2
The causes and effects of this internationalization are
manifold, often overlapping, and thus cannot be clearly
distinguished.' Commentators Cox, Hillman and Langevoort
provide a very short but illuminating explanation: "Fiber
optics, the microwave relay, and the satellite, not to mention
changes in the tax laws and the cooperative efforts of
government regulators, have each contributed greatly to the
internationalization of securities offerings.... .'
Internationalization of the world's securities markets also
implies interdependency *between markets.' The
interdependence of the markets was underscored on "Black
Monday" in October 1987 when prices plunged in all major
markets, even though some national economies did not
themselves face the economic problems identified by some as
causes of the U.S. market decline (i.e., declining currency
values, trade deficit and budget deficit).' In addition to the
SEC). For examples of the ext~nt of internationalization, see Aulana L.
Peters & Andrew E. Feldman, The Changing Structure of the Securities
Markets and the Securities Industry: Implications for International
Securities Regulation, 9 MICH. Y.B. INT'L LEGAL STUD. 19, 22-24 (1988);
David E. Van Zandt, The Regulatory and Institutional Conditions for an
International Securities Market, 32 VA. J. INT'L L. 47, 56-58 (1991). For
figures showing the trade of foreign securities on different national
exchanges, see Friedrich Kiibler, Regulatory Problems in Internationalizing
Trading Markets, 9 U. PA. J. INT'L Bus. L. 107, 107-08 (1987) [hereinafter
Regulatory Problems]. For statistics showing to what extent foreign
securities are traded in Germany and to what extent German securities are
traded abroad, see ANNUAL REPORT OF THE GERMAN STOCK EXCHANGES
1992, 142-69 (1992); DEUTSCHE BORSE AG, FRANKFURTER BORSENSTATISTIK
(1992).
See Regulatory Problems, supra note 1, at 109.
8 For descriptions and analyses, see HEINZ-DIETER ASSMANN, HANDBUCH
DES KAPITALANLAGERECHTS 26-27 (Assmann & SchUtze eds., 1990); HAROLD
BAUM & STEFAN BREIDENBACH, DIE WACHSENDE INTERNATIONALE VERFLECH-
TUNG DER WERTPAPIERMARKTE UND DIE REGELUNGSPOLITIK DER SECURITIES
AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION: NEUE ENTWICKLUNGEN IN DER INTER-
NATIONALEN ANWENDUNG DES AMERIKANISCHEN KAPITALMARKTRECHTS,
WERTPAPIER-MITrEILUNGEN/SONDERBEILAGE NR. 6 4-6 (1990); Regulatory
Problems, supra note 1, at 107-11; Van Zandt, supra note 1, at 60-66.
4 JAMES D. COX ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATIONS: CASES AND MATERIALS
327 (1991).
' See ASSMANN, supra note 3, at 24.
a See DIVISION OF MARKET REGULATION OF THE U.S. SECURITIES AND
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economic interdependence of the securities markets, the legal
systems regulating the securities markets have also become
interdependent, thereby decreasing the regulatory autonomy
of national legislators.7
1.2. Effects Of The Internationalization
The growing globalization of the capital markets has
enhanced competition between the different national market-
places. To ensure supply and demand of capital, a competitive
market must attract both investors and issuers. The most
attractive market will be the one having the least government
intervention, the highest liquidity, the lowest transaction
costs, the most freedom to innovate, and the lowest tax
burden.' In addition, market depth and market stability are
important considerations.'
This Article will describe how the different national
legislatures have dealt with the internationalization of the
capital markets (i.e., the reforms countries have adopted to
keep their markets competitive). The analysis will focus on
the regulation of securities issuance and trading. It is,
however, beyond the scope of this Article to describe the
impact of globalization on the regulation of investment
services, notwithstanding their importance in securities and
capital markets regulation. Section 2 will describe the
legislative concerns relating to the globalization of the capital
markets in general and will present an overview of national
reforms and their conceptual differences. Section 3 will
outline the recent reforms of U.S. securities laws adopted to
increase the competitiveness of the U.S. market. Section 4 will
describe recent developments in Europe. Legislative
developments in the European Community and the recent
reforms in the German market will be explored. Section 5 will
compare the different approaches underlying the national
reforms and posit reasons for existing differences. Finally,
EXCHANGE COMMISSION, THE OCTOBER 1987 MARKET BREAK REPORT (1988);
Peters & Feldman, supra note 1, at 35-36;
7 See ASSMANN, supra note 3, at 28.
* See id.
'See id.; Daniel L. Goelzer et al., Securities Regulation in the Inter-
national Marketplace: Bilateral and Multilateral Agreements, 9 MIcH. Y.B.
INT'L LEGAL STUD. 53, 54 (1988).
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this Article provides an outlook on the future of further
internationalization.
2. REGULATORY CONCERN WITH REGARD To
INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS
Two regulatory concerns are associated with inter-
nationalization. One concern, mentioned above, is the
enhanced competition between the different securities
markets. The other concern is the increasing possibility of
fraudulent conduct by market participants as inter-
nationalization moves forward. The Securities and Exchange
Commission (the "SEC") expressed these regulatory concerns
in the following way: "The challenge facing regulators of these
global securities markets is to ensure efficiency and hones-
ty."l" Due to the various structures of securities markets
around the world, the regulatory measures necessary to ensure
both "efficiency and honesty" are very different in each
market. A highly regulated securities market, like that of the
United States, will have problems maintaining efficiency (i.e.,
preventing business from flowing offshore and attracting
foreign investors) much more so than a deregulated system,
like the German securities market. Such a deregulated
market may, however, face other problems in attracting
foreign investors, such as trying to provide the necessary
framework for a modern and functioning marketplace.
Participants in cross-border securities transactions are
often beyond the reach of the regulatory agencies and the
courts of the state where the securities are issued or traded.
This leads to an additional regulatory concern: the regulator
must either apply its own legislation extraterritorially or
cooperate with regulators of other securities markets to
achieve harmonization or unification of the national securities
laws."
" Policy Statement of the Securities and Exchange Commission on the
Regulation of International Securities Markets, [1988-1989 Transfer Binder]
Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 84,341, at 89,576 (Nov. 1988).
" For an analysis of the problems associated with reaching the
participants in cross-border security transactions and the different possible
legislative solutions, see BAUM & BRELDENBACH, supra note 3, at 7-10
(describing in detail the problems of unilateral and extraterritorial
application of national legislation).
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2.1. The Responses Of U.S. Regulators
The securities market in the United States is characterized
by its enormous size and its high level of regulation. The
perceived complexity of the U.S. regulatory system, the related
cost of attaining and maintaining access to the U.S. market,
and fears about the level of disclosure required have made the
U.S. securities market unattractive to foreign issuers.
12
These problems have also induced business to move off-shore
to securities markets which have lower costs and require less
effort to raise capital.'
The above-mentioned effects were reinforced through the
extraterritorial application of U.S. securities laws. The U.S.
securities laws pursuant to section 5 of the Securities Act of
1933 (the "Securities Act") apply when a transaction is
accomplished by use of "interstate commerce and the mails." 4
Under section 2(7) of the Securities Act and section 3(a)(17) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the "Exchange Act"),
"interstate commerce" also includes "trade or commerce.., or
any transportation or communication... between any foreign
country and any State ... ."5 Thus, the U.S. securities laws
apply to nearly any cross-border securities transaction,
including the issuance of foreign securities in the United
States, the resale of securities which were issued in third
countries in the U.S. market, and the issuance of U.S.
securities abroad."
The SEC traditionally sought to enforce U.S. securities
laws even in the aforementioned extraterritorial situations.
This led to the proposal of the "waiver by conduct" rule,
suggesting that whoever engages in trading on the U.S.
"3 See Gregory K. Palm & Donald C. Walkovik, United States, INT'L FIN.
L. REV., July 1990 Supp., at 62.
1" For statistical figures on the decline of the U.S. share of the world
equity market and the decline of foreign issues registered in the United
States, see Roberta S. Karmel, SEC Regulation of Multijurisdictional
Offerings, 16 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 3, 15-16 (1990); Van Zandt, supra note 1,
at 78.
14 Securities Act of 1933 § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 77(e) (1988).
Securities Act of 1933 § 2(7), 15 U.S.C. § 77(b)(7) (1988); Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 § 3(a)(17), 15 U.S.C. § 78(c)(17) (1988).
" For a description of the extraterritorial application of the U.S.
securities laws, see DAvID L. RATNER, SECURITIEs REGULATIONS 295-304
(1992).
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market should be "presumed to have waived the protection of
domestic secrecy laws."'1  The secrecy laws of foreign
countries were aimed at protecting the confidentiality of the
relationship between a non-U.S. financial institution and its
customer." The expansive extraterritorial enforcement of
these laws, however, led to discrimination against U.S.
investors by foreign issuers (i.e., U.S. investors were excluded
from international rights, tender and exchange offers)."9
Over time, the SEC realized that extensive investor
protection could result not only in making a market less
competitive, but also in disadvantaging domestic investors.
Thus, in recent years the SEC has changed its attitude and
recognized the need to harmonize the requirements of the U.S.
securities laws with those of other jurisdictions. Furthermore,
the SEC has acknowledged the need for flexibility in applying
existing U.S. requirements to non-U.S. issuers in order to
provide U.S. investors with more of those increasingly
significant opportunities to invest in foreign securities.20 As
Sara Hanks, former Chief of the Office of International
Corporate Finance at the SEC, stated: "IT]he SEC wants to
meet the demands of U.S. investors to invest in foreign
securities .... [W]hile the SEC does not want to 'engage in a
race to the bottom' or lowering of standards, it is willing to be
more flexible to increase the attractiveness of U.S.
markets."2 ' This movement has led to a series of new
1 7Regulatory Problems, supra note 1, at 116.
18 For a critique of the waiver by conduct rule, see id. at 116-17.
18 See infra note 44 and accompanying text.
20 SEC Order, 52 Fed. Reg. 24,230 (1987). The recent listing of Daimler-
Benz AG at the New York Stock Exchange, the first German Company to
list its shares in the United States, shows that the U.S. market is still very
attractive to foreign issuers, and that the SEC's willingness to attract
foreign investors may ultimately be successful. See Ferdinand Protzman,
Ferdinand Protzman With Grand Rollout on Wall St., Daimler Flies in Face
of Bad News, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6, 1993, at D8; Germany's Daimler-Benz
Finds Parking Spot on NYSE, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 6, 1993, at D2; Daimler-Benz
Cheers Being 1st German Firm to be Listed on NYSE, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 5,
1993, at C3; Timothy Aeppel, Daimler-Benz Discloses Hidden Reserves Of
$2.45 Billion, Seeks Big Board Listing, WALL ST. J., Mar. 25, 1993, at A10;
Floyd Norris, Daimler-Benz Is Ready to Sign Up With Wall St., N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 25, 1993, at D1; David Waller & Martin Dickson, Daimler Discloses
DM4bn of Reserves, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 25, 1993, at 23; see also infra notes
217-18 and accompanying text.21 Hanks cites SEC 'Practical Stance' on International Securities Issues,
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legislative measures and proposals. 2
2.2. The Responses Of European Regulators
The European2 securities market is characterized by
different legislation in the different member states. Although
the level of regulation in Europe generally is much lower than
in the United States, the degree of regulation varies widely.
Due to the different regulatory systems in the twelve member
states and the restrictions on the transfer of capital which
have existed until recently, 4 the term "European securities
market" is misleading. One can only speak of twelve different
securities markets which are harmonizing and integrating, at
a growing speed, into a truly unified European securities
market.
As part of the European Commission's 1992 program to
create a single common market for goods, labor, capital, and
services in Europe, the Commission has worked on the
harmonization of the member states' laws that regulate the
securities markets.2  The program to harmonize the
securities industry (the "1992 program") mirrors the basic
principles of European Community law: mutual recognition,
harmonization of minimum standards, and coordination of
regulation among national authorities." The 1992 program
is aimed at achieving the internationalization of the
Communities' capital markets.2
22 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 3, at 103 (Jan. 19, 1990).
2 For a detailed description of these measures and proposals, see infra
Section 3.
23 As used hereafter, "Europe" or "European" refers to the territory of the
Member States of the European Community.14 See infra notes 92-93 and accompanying text.
The creation of a single market in the Community goes far beyond the
harmonization of the capital markets. Thus, the harmonization of the
capital markets in the Community must be understood as being only a part
of a more general movement towards harmonization within the Community.
See EDDY WYMEERCH, EEC, in INTERNATIONAL SECURITIEs REGULATION 3
(Rosen ed., 1991); see also infra note 85.
' For a description of the legislative measures which were taken under
the 1992 program, see infra Section 4.
" See David Reid & Andrew Ballheimer, The Legal Framework of the
Securities Industry in the European Community under the 1992 Program,
29 CoLUM. J. TRANSNATL L. 103, 142 (1991).
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Two motivations exist for legislative developments in the
member states' securities laws: (i) there is a desire to
harmonize the various systems in order to create a single
market in the European Community, and (ii) there is a need
to maintain a competitive marketplace. Several member
states introduced reforms to ensure the above-mentioned
"efficiency and honesty" of the markets." Great Britain's
"Big Bang" reform in 1986 is generally viewed as the most
revolutionary.29
The German securities market is an example of a highly
deregulated system. Nevertheless, Professor Kiibler describes
this stock market as "narrow, thin and boring.""0 Two figures
show the limited size of the German stock market: "there are
no more than 2,300 German stock corporations, and fewer than
630 are listed on one of the German stock exchanges.""' In
comparison with the U.S. industries, the German industries
seem to be undercapitalized." Thus, the German securities
market has no regulatory barriers which would make it
unattractive to foreign investors and issuers. However, its
limited size seems to make the German market less attractive.
Germany has traditionally had a virtually unregulated
system. The reform in 1984-85 was limited to the so-called
"Restliberalisierung," which was a further deregulation that
abolished some existing limitations vis A vis foreign investors
and issuers.3 3  Other changes in the recent German
legislation reflect the legislative harmonization efforts of the
European Community and are designed to provide the
necessary framework for a modern and functioning
28 See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
2 For a short description of the 1986 U.K. Big Bang and the reforms of
other European Countries, see Peters & Feldman, supra note 1, at 25-26;
HAROLD S. BLOOMENTHAL, EMERGING TRENDS IN SECURITIES LAW §§ 10.05-
.08 (1989).
" Friedrich K. Kiibler, Institutional Owners and Corporate Managers:
A German Dilemma, 57 BROOK. L. REv. 97, 106 (1991) [hereinafter German
Dilemma].
1 Id. at 101. The number of German stock corporations listed at the
German exchanges in 1992 was 665, the respective number of foreign stock
corporations listed in Germany was 594. ANNUAL REPORT OF THE GERMAN
STOCK EXCHANGES 1992 35, 165 (1992). For a description of the size of the
German market, see also infra note 145 and accompanying text.
SI German Dilemma, supra note 30, at 106.
8 ASSMANN, supra note 3, at 27.
[Vol. 14:4
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol14/iss4/2
1994] INTERNATIONALIZATION OF THE CAPITAL MARKETS 573
marketplace. The recent discussion in Germany also focuses
on increasing measures to protect investors and ensure the
element of "honesty" in the market. Several legislative
proposals 4 are aimed at establishing a federal securities
supervisory agency and promulgating legislation on insider
trading. 5
3. NEW LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS IN
THE UNITED STATES
The foregoing difficulties in ensuring the competitiveness
of the U.S. securities market have prompted the SEC to adopt
a number of legislative measures to adapt its regulatory
system to the globalized market.3 6 The new legislative
measures 7 address three main points: (i) registration and
reporting requirements for foreign issuers; (ii) multinational
offerings of securities; and (iii) application of section 5 of the
Securities Act to offshore transactions.
3.1. Registration And Reporting Requirements For Foreign
Issuers
Amendments to registration and reporting requirements for
foreign issuers under the U.S. disclosure rules addressed
foreign concerns. 8 For example, in adopting registration
forms F-1, F-2, and F-3, and in changing Form 20-F, the SEC
has lightened the disclosure burdens for foreign issuers. 9
"' For a description of the different legislative developments in recent
years, see infra section 4.
3 5 See infra notes 185-92 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 20-21 and accompanying text.
s For recent publications describing the different new developments, see
EDWARD F. GREENE ET AL., U.S. REGULATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL
SECURITIES MARKETS: A GUIDE FOR DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN ISSUERS AND
INTERMEDIARIES (1992); HAROLD S. BLOOMENTHAL, 10A INTERNATIONAL
CAPITAL MARKETS AND SECURITIES REGULATION ch. 5 (1990); HAROLD S.
BLOOMENTHAL, GOING PUBLIC AND THE PUBLIC CORPORATION ch. 4A (1993);
Karmel, supra note 13; Baum & Breidenbach, supra note 3; Palm &
Walkovik, supra note 12.
33 See COX ET AL., supra note 4, at 328; GREENE ET AL., supra note 37, at
ch. 2; Robert P. Austin, Regulatory Principles and the Internationalization
of Securities Markets, 50 LAW CONTEMP. PROBS. 221, 234-36 (1987); for
further bibliographic references, see supra note 37,
" These amendment and changes lightening the disclosure burden for
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Such foreign issuers have the option not to disclose certain
categories of information or to have lower disclosure
obligations (i.e., information regarding management
compensation).4" For example, foreign issuers which are
listed on the NYSE or the AMEX are not required to report
quarterly, but are allowed to report semiannually if such
reporting is consistent with the regulation in. their home
country.4'
These legislative amendments are deregulatory in nature
and they only address foreign issuers who want to undergo the
cumbersome process of registering their securities in the
United States. Thus, only a limited number of issuers will be
affected by these changes. For those foreign issuers, however,
the amendments make compliance with the registration
requirements a much less burdensome task.
3.2. The United States - Canada Multijurisdictional Disclosure
System
Multijurisdictional offerings of securities demonstrate that
the securities markets are becoming increasingly international.
One of the main difficulties of simultaneous multijurisdictional
foreign issuers were proposed in Integrated Disclosure System for Foreign
Private Issuers, [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
83,054 (Nov. 20, 1981); Age of Financial Statements of Non-North
American Foreign Private Issuers, [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 83,055 (Nov. 20, 1981); Financial Statements of Foreign
Issuers, [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 83,056 (Nov.
20, 1981); and adopted in 17 C.F.R. §§ 200-60 (1993).
40 See GREENE ET AL., supra note 37, at 110.
4' See SEC Order, 52 Fed. Reg. 24,230 (1987); GREENE ET AL., supra note
37, at 50, 101; Karmel,. supra note 13, at 8.
However, companies that publish financial statements only
semiannually can find that they are unable to conduct a public offering in
the U.S. during several months of the year (a "black out period"), because
the requirements of having current financial statements for the offering of
securities under Rule 3-19 of Regulation S-X mandates more recent financial
information than the reporting requirements. The SEC has released
proposed amendments to Rule 3-19 that would remove these major
impediments for foreign issuers. See Amendments to Rule and Form
Requirements Which Govern Age of Financial Statements of Foreign Private
Issuers, [1991 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 84,801 (June 5,
1991). See also Harold Schimkat, Note, The SEC's Proposed Regulations of
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offerings is the different prospectus requirements in the
securities markets in which the securities will be issued.
In response to this problem, the SEC issued in 1985 a concept
release, Facilitation of Multinational Securities Offerings,43
with the intent to harmonize the disclosure standards and
distribution systems of the United States and other countries.
In this concept release, the SEC discussed two possibilities:
either a common prospectus approach, (different regulators
adopt unified disclosure standards for an offering document),
or a reciprocity approach, (different regulators accepting one
another's home country's standards of disclosure). The SEC
chose the reciprocity approach in adopting the United States-
Canada multijurisdictional disclosure system (the "MJDS").'4
Under the MJDS, Canada and the United States have each
agreed to recognize the disclosure documents of issuers if they
are prepared and reviewed under the standards of the issuer's
home country.4' Even under the new rules, issuers are still
42 For a detailed description of the problems of multinational offerings
see Austin, supra note 38, at 246-48; for a description of problems regarding
the protection and representation of bondholders in multinational debt
offerings, see Frederic C. Rich, InternationalDebt Obligations of Enterprises
in Civil Law Countries: The Problem of Bondholder Representation, 21 VA.
J. INT'L L. 269 (1981).
' [1984-1985 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 83,743 (Feb. 28,
1985).
"" The MJDS was initially proposed in Multijurisdictional Disclosure,
[1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) 84,432 (July 26, 1989);
reproposedin Multijurisdictional Disclosure and Modification to the Current
Registration and Reporting System for Canadian Issuers, [1990-1991
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 84,701 (Oct. 16, 1990); and
finally adopted in Multijurisdictional Disclosure and Modification to the
Current Registration and Reporting System for Canadian Issuers, [1991
Transfer Binder] Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) 84,812 (June 21, 1991).
"" The MJDS states, "good faith compliance with the disclosure
requirements of the home jurisdiction, as construed by Canadian regulatory
authorities, will constitute compliance with the applicable U.S. federal
securities disclosure requirements, even if such compliance results in the
omission of information which might otherwise have been required as a line
item in registration statements filed by U.S. issuers on the Commission's
other registration forms." Multijurisdictional Disclosure and Modification,
[1991 Transfer Binder], supra note 44, 84,812 at 81,881.
For a description of the MJDS, see HAROLD S. BLOOMENTBAL & SAMUEL
WOLFF, EMERGING TRENDS IN SECURITIES LAws, Ch. 8 (1991); Alan Goggins,
Comment, Taking That First Step: The Securities and Exchange
Commission's Proposed Multijurisdictional Disclosure System, 14 MD. J.
INT'L L. & TRADE 43 (1990); Sarah Hanks & Elizabeth Jacobs, United States
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subject to the anti-fraud and civil liability provisions of the
offering country. Furthermore, the MJDS does not apply to
every filing made in accordance with the home country's
requirements, but is limited instead to certain major issuers
which qualify under the MJDS's rules,4' and to certain
specific rights, tender and exchange offers.
The MJDS is a deregulatory step in U.S. legislative history.
Despite the fact that the MJDS is limited to cross-border
transactions between the United States and Canada, it is of
considerable interest to others. The MJDS marks the first
time the SEC has recognized disclosure documents established
under the standards of an issuer's home country. The SEC
itself described the new provisions as "a logical first step in
meeting the needs of transnational securities transactions.' 7
Thus, agreements with other nations, especially the United
Kingdom, seem possible in the future. An agreement with the
United Kingdom could have further effects on the other
member states of the European Community, given the above
mentioned harmonization efforts already underway in the
Community." One must bear in mind, though, that the
SEC's acceptance of reciprocal recognition of disclosure
standards was largely influenced by the similarity of the
regulatory systems and the accounting and auditing
standards49 of Canada and the United States, and by the
significant presence of Canadian issuers in the U.S. market.
and Canada: A New System for Multijurisdictional Disclosure, INT'L FIN.
L. REV., Sept. 1989, at 19; Edward B. Claxton et al., Multijurisdictional
Disclosure: A Practitioners' View, INT'L FIN. L. REV., Oct. 1989, at 11. The
MJDS applies not only in cases of multinational offerings, but also in case
of single foreign offerings.
46 Issuers eligible to rely on the MJDS are "Canadian eligible issuers,"
having fulfilled certain requirements of total capitalization, public market
float, reporting or listing history, or some additional criteria (in other words,
they must be "substantial issuers").
"" Multijurisdictional Disclosure, [1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 1 84,432, at 80,282 (July 26, 1989).
48 See Baum & Breidenbach, supra note 3, at 28.
4 Financial statements are the basis of disclosure in every regulatory
system. Therefore, reciprocal recognition of disclosure documents standards
will depend largely on the development of international accounting and
auditing standards. For a short description of the efforts towards the
development of international GAAP and GAAS, see Karmel, supra note 13,
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Therefore, it is doubtful whether this "first step" really
indicates a new willingness by the SEC to adapt the U.S.
regulatory system to the demands of market
internationalization. 0 However, the U.S. market will attract
a significant portion of foreign market participants only if the
"first step" is followed by a "second step" that expands the
concept of the MJDS beyond Canada.
3.3. The SEC Proposal On The Regulation Of Cross-Border
Rights, Tender And Exchange Offers
Internationalization of securities markets has also occurred
in the context of cross-border rights, tender and exchange
offers. In these offers, U.S. shareholders were often excluded
by foreign issuers who concluded that the burdens of
complying with U.S. securities laws were more cumbersome
than the benefits of including the U.S. shareholders. The
result was not only that those U.S. shareholders lost the
possibility of realizing a premium on their shares, but also
that they often had to sell in the market below the offering
price in order to avoid remaining minority shareholders
subject to a possible freeze-out.5  To eliminate this
disadvantage, the SEC proposed new regulations concerning
foreign tender and exchange offers, foreign rights offers, and
financial reporting requirements for foreign issuers.52 The
5* See Karmel, supra note 13, at 9-11; Claxton et al., supra note 45, at 14
(warning not to be to optimistic).
F' For a detailed description of the various problems arising in the
context of international tender and exchange offers, including the exclusion
of U.S. security holders from such transactions, see John C. Maguire,
Regulatory Conflicts: International Tender and Exchange Offers in the
1990s, 19 PEPP. L. REV. 939 (1992).
" See Concept Release On Multinational Tender and Exchange Offers,
Securities Act Release No. 6866, [1990 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 84,606 (June 6, 1990); Cross-Border Rights Offers;Amendments to
Form F-3, Securities Act Release No. 6896, [1991 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. (CCH) 84,802 (June 5, 1991); International Tender and Exchange
Offers, Securities Act Release No. 6897, [1991 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 1 84,803 (June 5, 1991); Amendments to Rule and Form
Requirements Which Governs Age of Financial Statements of Foreign Private
Issuers, Securities Act Release No. 6895, [1991 Transfer Binder] Fed. See.
L. Rep. (CCH) 84,801 (June 5, 1991); these proposals are not expected to
be adopted before the end of 1993.
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main changes would occur on two levels5 s  First, the
proposals provide an exemption from the registration
requirements of the Securities Act if the aggregate dollar
amount of securities offered to U.S. holders in a tender,
exchange or rights offer does not exceed $5 million (Rules 801
and 802). Second, the proposals introduce new forms, F-11
and F-12, to facilitate the registration of securities by foreign
bidders. Form F-11 could be used for rights offerings of
unlimited size by qualified foreign private issuers. Form F-12
could be used for exchange offers and business combinations
when only five percent or less of the class of securities subject
to the offer is held by U.S. holders. Furthermore, several
exemptions from the Williams Act and the Trust Indenture Act
would be granted in the case of tender and exchange offers if
ten percent or less of the securities are held by U.S. holders.
Under the proposals, foreign issuers generally would be able
to use documents prepared in accordance with the laws and
accounting standards of their, or the target company's, home
jurisdiction. This is the so-called "principle of full recognition."
The new proposals seem to be the "second step" following
the enactment of the MJDS with Canada. In several respects,
the new proposals go beyond the MJDS which is based on the
fact that the framework of the securities laws, accounting
systems, and auditing standards are very similar in the United
States and in Canada. Therefore, whereas the MJDS is
mainly based on harmonization of the various systems, the
new proposals are based on the principle of mutual
recognition. This is evidenced, for example, by the fact that
the regulatory authorities under the MJDS retain discretion to
intervene in various circumstances, while under the new
proposals, registration statements on the new Forms F-11 and
F-12 become effective without the SEC's review. The MJDS's
reach, however, is much broader, providing special registration
forms for offerings of any securities by Canadian issuers,
5' For a description of the new proposals see Baum & Breidenbach, supra
note 3, at 29; Daniel L. Goelzer & Anne H. Sullivan, The Continuing
Disclosure System: Problems and Participants, in SECURITIES AND EX-
CHANGE COMMISSION REGULATION OF TRANSNATIONAL TENDER OFFERS, II
SELECTED ARTICLES OF FEDERAL SECURITIES LAW 435 (1991); James M.
Bartos, A New Deal for U.S. Investors in Foreign Markets, INT'L FIN. L.
REV., July 1991, at 27; Bloomenthal & Wolff, supra note 45, § 7; Schimkat,
supra note 41, at S215-25.
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whereas the new proposals only address securities offerings of
limited size in the context of mergers and acquisitions, as well
as rights offerings by qualified foreign private issuers.
While this "second step" shows the continuing effort of the
SEC to adapt the U.S. regulatory system to the inter-
nationalization of the markets, these new proposals are limited
to a small group of securities issuers. Thus, a "third step,"
which would extend the scope of the MJDS to other countries,
is necessary to attract a more significant group of market
participants from abroad.
3.4. Limitations On The Scope Of The Application Of Section 5
Of The Securities Act
As previously mentioned, the U.S. securities market
remains unattractive for many foreign issuers of securities due
to the extensive reach of section 5 of the Securities Act."
Despite the adoption of measures to facilitate compliance, the
extensive registration and disclosure requirements of the U.S.
securities laws remain burdensome for foreign issuers. The
SEC addressed this problem by adopting two new proposals
which limit the applicability of section 5. Regulation S
exempts offshore transactions, such as securities issued
outside the United States, from the registration requirements
of section 5. Rule 144A is designed to facilitate the resale of
restricted securities, that is, securities which have not been
registered with the SEC because they where issued under a
private placement exemption.55 Thus, under both Regulation
S and Rule 144A, foreign issuers are exempt from the
proscriptions of section 5.
54 See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
' For a description of Regulation S and Rule 144A, see Bevis Longstreth
et al., Regulation S and Rule 144A: Has the SEC got it right?, INT'L FIN. L.
REV., Sept. 1989, at 30; HAROLD S. BLOOMENTHAL ET AL., 1992 GOING
PUBLIC HANDBOOK: GOING PUBLIC, THE INTEGRATED DISCLOSURE SYSTEM
AND EXEMPT FINANCING, §§ 2.07, 2.08. (1992); HAROLD S. BLOOMENTaAL ET
AL., EMERGING TRENDS IN SECURITIES LAW, §§ 8, 9 (1989 ed.); for further
bibliographic references, see supra note 37.
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3.4.1. Regulation S
The purpose of Regulation S56  is to clarify the
extraterritorial application of section 5.57 Section 901
contains the general statement that offers and sales of
securities made outside the United States are not subject to
the Securities Act registration requirement. Before the
enactment of Regulation S, the scope of the extraterritorial
application of section 5 was defined in Release 4708.58 Under
this release, section 5 did not apply if the offer was (i)
distributed abroad; (ii) distributed only to foreign nationals;
and (iii) had "come to rest abroad." The interpretation of
whether an offer has "come to rest abroad" was especially
unclear and resulted in frequent requests to the SEC for "no-
action letters." In contrast to the approach under the old
Release 4708, Regulation S takes a strict geographic approach:
offers and sales occurring outside the United States, even if
made to U.S. citizens, are beyond the scope of section 5.59
"Regulation S was initially proposed in Securities Act Release No. 6779,
[1987-1988 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 84,242 (June 10,
1988); reproposedin Securities Act Release No. 6838, [1989 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 84,426 (July 11, 1989); and finally adopted in
Securities Act Release No. 6863, [1989-1990 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 1 84,524 (Apr. 24, 1990).
" For a description of Regulation S, see Don Berger, Offshore
Distributions of Securities: The Impact of Regulation S, 3 TRANSNAT'L LAW.
575 (1990); Ronald R. Adee, Regulation S: The Safe Harbor for Offshore
Securities Transactions, 58 C.P.S. (BNA) (1991); Samuel Wolff, Offshore
Distributions Under the Securities Act of 1933: An Analysis of Regulation
S, 23 LAW & POL'Y INT'L BUs. 101 (1992); Beller & Pergam, Regulation S:
SEC seeks comment, INT'L FIN. L. REV., Aug. 1988, at 15; for further
bibliographic references, see supra notes 37, 53.
" See Securities Act Release No. 4708, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH), IT 1361-
63 (July 9, 1964).
"' See Berger, supra note 57, at 581; Securities Act Release No. 6863,
states:
The Regulation ... is based on a territorial approach to Section 5
of the Securities Act. The registration of securities is intended to
protect the U.S. capital markets and investors purchasing in the
U.S. market, whether U.S. or foreign nationals. Principles of
comity and the reasonable expectations of participants in the global
markets justify reliance on laws applicable in jurisdictions outside
the United States to define requirements for transactions effected
offshore. The territorial approach recognizes the primacy of the
laws in which a market is located. As investors choose their
markets, they choose the laws and regulations applicable in such
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The general statement in section 901 provides several
guidelines for determining whether a particular offer or sale
occurs outside the United States. Following the general
statement, Regulation S contains two safe harbor provisions,
sections 903 and 904, which provide prospective issuers
planning a foreign-targeted offering clearer guidance than the
predecessor to Regulation S. °O Both safe harbors are only
available if two criteria, defined in section 902, are met: (i)
the offer or sale must occur in an "offshore transaction;" and
(ii) no "directed selling efforts" may be made in the United
States. Section 903, the "issuer safe harbor," is designed for
offers and sales by issuers and securities professionals
involved in the distribution process. The "issuer safe harbor"
is subdivided into three categories, taking into consideration
(i) whether the issuer is a U.S. issuer, (ii) whether it is a
reporting company under the 1934 Act, and (iii) the degree of
interest in its securities in U.S. markets. Depending on which
category applies, the offshore issue of securities is allowed
either without further restrictions, or if certain restrictions
designed to prevent a "flow-back" of the issued securities to the
United States are met. These restrictions include selling
periods, lock-up procedures, and legends on the securities.
Section 904 is the "resale safe harbor," which applies to the
resale of restricted securities outside the United States.
3.4.2. Rule 144A
The SEC adopted Rule 144A for two main reasons."' The
first was to provide greater liquidity in the secondary market
markets.
Securities Act Release No. 6863, supra note 56, at 80,665.
60 "While certainly much more complex in its detailed definitional
approach than old Release 4708, Regulation S has the potential advantage
of obviating or reducing the need to seek administrative clarification from
the Commission by way of no-action letters for particular transactions."
Berger, supra note 57, at 582.
" Rule 144A was initially proposed in Securities Act Release No. 6806,
[1988-1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 84,335 (Oct. 25,
1988); reproposed in Securities Act Release No. 6839, [1989 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 84,427 (July 11, 1989); and finally adopted in
Securities Act Release No. 6862, [1989-1990 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 1 84,523 (April 23, 1990) (codified at 17 C.F.R. § 230.144A
(1991)).
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for privately placed securities. The second was to attract more
foreign issuers to the U.S. market through greater liquidity of
the secondary market, and to prevent domestic issuers from
considering foreign securities markets as alternatives to the
U.S. market. The issuance of securities in a private
placement, without registering under section 5 of the
Securities Act, results in a considerable cost reduction, up to
two thirds less than a public distribution,6 2 and avoids the
reporting requirements of a public company."'
Resales are not "distributions" under Rule 144A and
thus qualify under the registration exemption of section 4(1)
of the Securities Act. Thus, Rule 144A is another safe harbor
provision designed to remove regulatory uncertainties. To
qualify under Rule 144A, the restricted securities must be sold
to a "qualified institutional buyer" ("QIB")."5 The rule defines
62 See Baum & Breidenbach, supra note 3, at 23; Glenn M. Reiter &
Stephen B. Grant, Resales of U.S. Privately-Placed Securities, INT'L FIN. L.
REv., Jan. 1989, at 20, 23.
6" The SEC states in the initial proposal of Rule 144A-
Providing a framework in which institutional resales could be made
freely may increase the efficiency of the private placement market.
The potential increase in efficiency and liquidity could significantly
lower the discount commonly associated with private placements
.... Greater participation by foreign issuers in the U.S. capital
markets also would have the benefit of reducing the costs borne by
U.S. institutional investors that wish to invest in foreign securities
and are compelled at present to go overseas to obtain such
securities.
Securities Act Release No. 6806, supra note 61, at 89,533.
"' For a detailed description of Rule 144A, see EDWARD F, GREENE ET AL.,
RuLE 144A: THE EXPANDED PRIVATE PLACEMENT MARKET (1990); Sara
Hanks, Rule 144A: Another Cabbage in the Chop Suey, 24 GEO. WASH. J.
INT'L L. & ECON. 305 (1990); Vickie. Kokkalenios, Increasing United States
Investment in Foreign Securities: An Evaluation of SEC Rule 144A, 60
FORDHAM L. REV. S179 (1992); Lawrence R. Seidman, SEC Rule 144A: The
Rule Heard Round the Globe - Or the Sounds of Silence?, 47 Bus. LAw. 333
(1991); Kellye Y. Testy, The Capital Markets in Transition: A Response to
New SEC Rule 144A, 66 IND. L.J. 233 (1990); Reiter & Grant, supra note
58; for further bibliographic references see supra notes 37, 55.
6 See 17 C.F.R. § 230.144A(a)(1). The SEC states in the initial proposal
of Rule 144A. "The key to the analysis of proposed Rule 144Ais that certain
institutions can fend for themselves .... ." Securities Act Release No. 6806,
supra note 61, at 89,539. The notion of being "able to fend for themselves"
was introduced by the Supreme Court in SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346
U.S. 119, 125 (1953). For a more detailed analysis of the theory behind Rule
144A, see Hanks, supra note 64, at 321-31; Seidman, supra note 64, at 337.
[Vol. 14:4
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol14/iss4/2
19941 INTERNATIONALIZATION OF THE CAPITAL MARKETS 583
a QIB as an institution with a portfolio of securities valued at
more than $100 million owned or under its management.6
The rule applies only to securities which are not "fungible."
For example, it excludes those securities which are already
traded on a national stock exchange or on the NASDAQ. 6"
Furthermore, Rule 144A provides that the issuer, if it is not a
reporting company under the Exchange Act or an eligible
Schedule B"8 issuer, is obligated at the request of the seller
or the buyer, to provide investors with certain reasonable and
current business and financial information. 9 Finally, the
seller is required to ensure that the purchaser is aware of the
seller's reliance on Rule 144A to sell unregistered
60 See 17 C.F.R. § 230.144A(a)(1)(i). Additional requirements exist for
banks and savings and loan associations, including foreign banks and their
U.S. branches. See 17 C.F.R. 230.144A(a)(1)(vi). $10 million threshold is
applied to brokers and dealers. For specific transactions no threshold
applies. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.144A(aXl)(ii). The definition of qualified
institutional buyer as originally proposed by the SEC would have included
institutions with assets in excess of $5 million. Some commentators
expressed fear that the rule would encourage the development of a private,
unregulated securities market alongside the public market. The SEC,
however, stated in its adoptive release of Rule 144A that it was open to
further comment on this threshold and suggested expanding the scope of the
safe harbor if experience proves the rule a success. See supra note 57. In
October 1992, the SEC adopted Securities Act Release No. 6963, expanding
the definition of qualified institutional buyer to include certain collective
and master trusts and insurance company separate accounts. The
amendment also permits any institution to include its holdings of U.S.
government and similar securities in determining whether it is a QIB. See
Securities Act Release No. 6963, [1992 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 1 85,052, 83,383 (Oct. 22, 1992)
6' See Securities Act Release No. 6806, supra note 61, at 89,534. This
exclusion is also designed to prevent the establishment of a private,
unregulated market alongside the public regulated markets.
*s Schedule B lists the matters which foreign governments or their
subdivisions issuing debt securities must disclose.
so See 17 C.F.R. § 230.144A(d)(4). Many foreign issuers request an
exemption from the reporting requirements of the Exchange Act under Rule
12g3-2(b). If an issuer qualifies for this exemption, it must furnish to the
SEC on an ongoing basis material information which it (i) makes public in
its home country; (ii) files with stock exchanges on which its securities are
traded and which is made public by such exchanges; or (iii) distributes to its
shareholders. This "home country information," which is on file with the
SEC after obtaining the 12g3-2(b) exemption, is sufficient to comply with the
aforementioned Rule 144A information requirements. For a description of
Rule 12g3-2(b) see Sara Hanks & Daniel Bushner, Rule 12g3-2(b): Backdoor
or Trapdoor?, INT'L. FIN. L. REV., Apr. 1991, at 36.Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
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securities.70
3.4.3. Combination Of Regulation S And Rule 144A
Foreign investors that were not attracted to the U.S.
securities market because of the extensive registration and
reporting requirements have completely new opportunities
through the combination of Regulation S and Rule 144A."'
Two ways of combining these sets of rules are particularly
appealing. First, under Regulation S, non-U.S. issuers can sell
securities offshore to a U.S. dealer who can buy the securities
for immediate resale to a QIB under Rule 144A.7 2 Second,
the acquisition of securities in a private placement is even
more attractive since a resale is not only possible under Rule
144A, but also in an offshore transaction under Regulation S.
3.4.4. An Evaluation Of The New Sets Of Rules Limiting
The Scope Of Applicability Of Section 5 Of The Securities
Act
Regulation S and Rule 144A may have the most significant
impact of all the recent legislative measures designed to
increase the interest of foreign issuers in the U.S. market and
decrease the migration of U.S. business offshore.7" Under
70 See 17 C.F.R. § 230.144A(d)(2).
71 For a description of the effects of such a combination of Regulation S
and Rule 144A, see Longstreth et al., supra note 55, at 33; Hanks, supra
note 64, at 333 n.149; Reiter & Grant, supra note 62, at 22-23; Palm &
Walkovik, supra note 12, at 77; BAuM & BREIDENBACH, supra note 3, at 27.
7' The offer and sale of securities offshore to a U.S. dealer and the resale
to a qualified institutional buyer in the United States relieves foreign
issuers of the risk of being subjected to U.S. disclosure requirements under
the 1934 Act. If foreign issuers would enter the U.S. market directly under
Rule 144A, and their securities leak into the public markets, they could lose
their Rule 12g3-2 exemption from the 1934 Act reporting requirements. See
supra note 69. Thus, only a combination of these rules will increase the
attractiveness of the U.S. securities markets. See Proposed Rule 144A May
Not Attract Foreign Issuers to U.S. Markets, SEC Told, 21 Sec. Reg. & L.
Rep. (BNA), at 413 (Mar. 17, 1989); Longstreth et al., supra note 55, at 32.
7' The impact of Rule 144A is strengthened through the creation of
PORTAL (Private Offerings, Resales and Trading through Automated
Linkages). PORTAL is an SEC-approved screen-based computer and
communication system which is operated by the NASD since the summer of
1990. PORTAL established an exempt marketplace for the trading of
unregistered foreign securities under Rule 144A. See Cox ET AL., supra note
4, at 485; Seidman, supra note 64, at 344-46.
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these measures, foreign issuers can issue securities in the U.S.
private placement market, and U.S. securities can be issued
and traded abroad, without registration under the Securities
Act. Thus, the burden of compliance with the U.S. securities
laws is reduced significantly by Regulation S and Rule 144A,
even more so than under the new reporting requirements for
foreign issuers,' or under the MJDS" and the new
proposals regarding cross-border rights, tender and exchange
offers." The reach of the new reporting requirements for
foreign issuers and the MJDS, however, is much broader. The
requirements apply to the issuance of any securities by foreign
issuers. Regulation S and Rule 144A, on the other hand, only
apply to offshore transactions or to transactions in the private
placement market.
Nevertheless, several commentators have criticized Rule
144A. One commentator highlighted the inconsistency
between the requirements to qualify as an "accredited
investor" under Regulation D (for example, an institution with
only $5 million in assets or individuals with even fewer
assets), and to qualify as a QIB under Rule 144A (for example,
an institution with $100 million in securities)." It does not
seem just that a small institution may buy securities directly
from the issuer under Regulation D, but may not buy the same
securities under Rule 144A from another source. 8 Further,
limiting the number of potential buyers under Rule 144A also
limits the scope of this rule.
A second criticism is that under current Rule 144A, foreign
issuers are encouraged to participate only in the private
The adoption of Rule 144A is a qualified success. "As of April 1993,
approximately $5.30 billion in equity and $5.57 billion in debt securities of
foreign issuers have been sold in Rule 144A placements in the United
States." Securities Act Release No. 33-6999, 58 Fed. Reg. 27,686, 27,687 n.6
(1993). For more detailed information about the success of Rule 144A see
SEC, STAFF REPORT ON RULE 144A (Jan. 27, 1993).
See supra Section 3.1.
See supra Section 3.2.
See supra Section 3.3.
" See Seidman, supra note 64, at 349. In addition to the general
exemption for private placements under § 4(2) of the Securities Act,
Regulation D establishes exemptions for non-public and other limited
offerings.
"8 See Hanks, supra note 64, at 341; Kokkalenios, supra note 64, at S193-
94; Seidman, supra note 64, at 348-50.Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
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market, and not in the public market. Several commentators
suggest that the changes of the reporting and disclosure
requirements do not reach far enough, and that the only way
to attract foreign issuers into the U.S. capital market is to
extend the harmonization previously achieved under the MJDS
to other countries."9
The effect of Regulation S was limited by the enactment of
the "TEFRA D"-rules by the Internal Revenue Service (the
"IRS").o The IRS is concerned about bearer bonds, which are
very common in Europe, and which may provide ways for
people to avoid U.S. taxes. The previous IRS regulations were
designed to correspond with the old Release 4708. The new
rules of the IRS, however, do not correspond to Regulation S.
They are far more stringent for U.S. reporting issuers. Thus,
these issuers have to take into consideration two different sets
of rules, one from the IRS and one from the SEC. The more
stringent IRS rules prevent Regulation S from achieving its
goals, at least as far as bearer debt obligations are concerned.
This indicates that efficient capital markets can only be
achieved if tax and other laws comport with the goals of the
securities laws.
However, it can be concluded that despite the SEC's rather
cautious retreat from their traditional approach vis A vis
international securities transactions, Regulation S and Rule
144A have already had a significant impact in attracting
foreign issuers into the U.S. securities markets."'
4. NEW LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS IN EUROPE
Legislative developments relating to the inter-
nationalization of the European capital markets are two-fold.
On one hand, within its general efforts to create a single
common market for goods, labor, capital, and services, there is
a movement toward harmonization of securities laws within
the European Community. On the other hand, individual
"' See Hanks, supra note 64, at 350-51; Karmel, supra note 13, at 15-16;
see infra text accompanying note 204.
" See Treas. Reg. § 1.163-5(c)(2)(i)(D) (as amended in 1990). For a short
description of the "TEFRA D"-rules and their effect on Regulation S, see
Robert Clow, All Quiet on the Euromarket Front, INT'L FIN. L. REV., Feb.
1991, at 13.
"1 See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
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member states are instituting legislative changes to adapt
their respective national regulatory system to the European
Community in order to attain a competitive securities
market.8" In the following description, Germany, having one
of the least regulated systems in the European Community, is
used as a representative model of the different national
reforms taking place. All of these legislative changes can be
characterized as both deregulatory and re-regulatory in
nature.8"
4.1. Legislative Developments Within The European
Community
The legislative harmonization within the Community
regarding the different national regulations of the securities
markets is only a part of the more general efforts of the
Community to create a single market."' A description of the
history and the institutions, as well as the legislation with
respect to the Community's creation of a single market, is
beyond the scope of this Article. 5 Nevertheless, a short
explanation of the legislative mechanism through which
harmonization will be achieved is useful.
The principle instruments of Community action under the
EC Treaty are the "Regulation," the "Directive" and the
"Recommendation." 6 The harmonization measures of the
s2 See supra text accompanying notes 27, 29.
"For an explanation of the interference of deregulation and regulation,
see NORMAN S. POSER, INTERNATIONAL SECURITIES REGULATION: LONDON'S
"BIG BANG" AND THE EUROPEAN SECURITIES MARKETS 1-5 (1991), who
entitles this section "The Paradox of Simultaneous Deregulation and
Regulation"; Manning G. Warren III, Global Harmonization of Securities
Laws: The Achievements of the European Communities, 31 HARV. INT'L L.J.,
185, 187-89 (1990) [hereinafter Harmonization].
4 See supra text accompanying notes 25-26.
'For a short description of the background of the Community and the
different measures to create a single market, see BLOOMENTHAL & WOLFF,
supra note 45, at § 10-5-10 with further bibliographical references;
WYMEERCH, supra note 25, at 1-3; Harmonization, supra note 83, at 195-97;
Manning G. Warren III, Regulatory Harmony in the European Communities:
The Common Market Prospectus, 16 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 19, 22-25 (1990)
[hereinafter Prospectus]; DIETHER HOFFMANN, BANKEN- UND BORSENRECHT
DER EWG ch. 1-3 (1990); Common Market in Profile, 1 Common Mkt. Rep.
(CCH) 1 100 (1988); id. at 1 101 (1987).
"'For a short explanation of these different legislative instruments see
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Community have been carried out mostly through the adoption
of Council "directives" which must be implemented by
legislation in each member state. These directives are binding
on each member state to which they are addressed, but leave
to the member states the choice of form and the method of
implementation into national law. 7
The legislative efforts of the Community to harmonize the
national regulations of the securities markets are manifold.
Directives which are directly related to the area of securities
regulation will be discussed in the following sections of this
Article. The company law directives are also related to the
Community's efforts to harmonize the securities markets.
Although these company law directives are not the focus of
this Article, 8 they must be mentioned to understand the
scope and the magnitude of the Community's initiatives in the
financial services area. Furthermore, it is also outside the
scope of this Article to describe the existing and proposed
directives relating to investment services, notwithstanding
their importance to the internationalization of the securities
markets.8 " Thus, the following description will be limited to
the existing and proposed directives concerning the issuance,
and trade of, securities. The underlying purpose of most of
these directives is the removal of barriers resulting from the
conflicting regulatory requirements of the individual member
states. The enacted and proposed directives aim to provide
greater flexibility in, and greater access to, the capital markets
of the Community, and an equivalent standard of protection
WYMEERCH, supra note 25, at 2-3; Law Making Powers of the Institutes, 3
Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 4902 (1976).
" For a short description of the legal status of directives and their
implementation into national law, see WYMEERCH, supra note 25, at 10-11;
Law Making Powers of the Institutes, supra note 86, at 4116-17.
88 For a short description of the Company law directives, see
Harmonization, supra note 83, at 197-209.
89 For a description of the two Banking Directives, the Own Funds
Directive, the Solvency Ratio Directive, a draft of Investment Services
Directive (which is not expected to be adopted until the end of 1993), and
the Capital Adequacy Directive, see Reid & Baliheimer, supra note 27, at
103-20 (outlining all six directives); HOFFMANN, supra note 85; WYMEERCH,
supra note 25, at 29-32; BLOOMENTHAL & WOLFF, supra note 45, § 10.03
(examining all six directives); POSER, supra note 83, at 347-53;
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for investors."
4.1.1. The Council Directive Implementing Article 67 Of
The EC Treaty
One of the four "founding freedoms" upon which the
Community is based is the free movement of capital.9" The
free movement of capital is especially important for the
creation of a truly integrated single securities market. After
a series of directives, the Council finally passed a directive
implementing Article 67 of the EC Treaty, which required the
abolition of all restrictions on the movement of capital between
residents of the Community. "  Under this directive, the
member states were required to eliminate these restrictions by
July 1, 1990, with transitory provisions for some member
states lasting until December 31, 1992. Until the passage of
the directive, the major restrictions on the free movement of
capital had been exchange controls. The goal of free movement
of capital encompasses, among many other monetary
transactions, all transactions in listed and unlisted
securities.9"
4.1.2. The Admissions Directive
The Admissions Directive, 4 which was adopted in 1979,
defines the minimum requirements" for the listing of equity
and debt securities on stock exchanges in the Community.
These minimum requirements are defined in schedules A and
B for equity and debt securities, respectively. Moreover, the
Admissions Directive imposes continuing obligations, such as,
reporting requirements, under schedules C and D for issuers
" See Reid & Ballheimer, supra note 27, at 123.
31 See EEC Treaty, pt. 2, tit. III.
32 See Council Directive 88/361, 1988 O.J. (L 178) 5, 7.
"For a short description of the directive implementing Article 67 of the
EEC Treaty see Reid & Ballheimer, supra note 27, at 123; WYMERCB,
supra note 25, at 7.
" See Council Directive 79/279, 1979 O.J. (L 66) 21, as amended by,
Council Directive 82/148, 1982 O.J. (L 62) 22.
"s Generally, the directives define minimum standards giving the
member states the discretion to impose more stringent requirements than
set forth in the directives, as long as these requirements are applied on a
non-discriminatory basis.
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of equity and debt securities, respectively. 6
4.1.3. The Listing Particulars Directive
The Listing Particulars Directive,9 which was adopted in
1980, defines minimum requirements" for drafting,
scrutinizing, and distributing an information statement (the
"listing particular"), which must be filed in connection with the
listing of securities on a stock exchange. The listing particular
also aims to facilitate the simultaneous and consecutive listing
of a security in a number of different member states.99
Layout and detailed disclosure requirements are defined in
schedules A and B for equity and debt securities,
respectively.1"
4.1.4. The Interim Reports Directive
The Interim Reports Directive,101 which was adopted in
1982, sets forth certain requirements for semiannual
reporting, complementing the annual and current reporting
requirements of the Admission Directive. It defines certain
minimum financial information"' which must be disclosed
and requires the publication of an explanatory statement
which must refer to the company's financial prospects for the
remainder of the fiscal year."°
"For a further description of the Admissions Directive, see Reid &
Ballheimer, supra note 27, at 124-25;Harmonization, supra note 83, at 209-
11; WYMEERCH, supra note 25, at 14, 16-17; HOFFMANN, supra note 85, at
107-08; Admission of Securities to Official Listing, 1 Common Mkt. Rep.
(CCH) 1725 (Aug. 30, 1983).
"' See Council Directive 80/390, 1980 O.J. (L 100) 1, as amended by,
Council Directive 82/148, 1982 O.J. (L 62) 22.
"See supra note 95.
"See infra notes 108-14 and accompanying text.
1" For a more detailed description of the Listing Particulars Directive,
see Reid & Ballheimer, supra note 27, at 125-26; Harmonization, supra note
83, at 211-13; WYMEERCH, supra note 25, at 14, 16-17; HOFFMANN, supra
note 85, at 107-08; Publication of Listing Particulars, Commentary, 1
Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 1735 (June 1990).
101 See Council Directive 82/121, 1982 O.J. (L 48) 26, 27-28.
102 See supra note 95.
"s For a more detailed description of the Interim Reports Directive, see
Reid & Ballheimer, supra note 27, at 126-27; Harmonization, supra note 83,
at 214-15; WYMEERCH, supra note 25, at 14, 20; HOFFMANN, supra note 85,
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4.1.5. The Public Offer Prospectus Directive
The Public Offer Prospectus Directive, which was adopted
in 1989, requires the publication of a prospectus in connection
with the public offering of securities, regardless of whether or
not these securities are listed on a stock exchange.'" Thus,
before a public offering is effective, any issue of securities in
the Community now requires the publication of a prospectus,
either through the listing particular or under the Public Offer
Prospectus Directive."5  The prospectus' .inimum
requirements' are similar to those of the listing
particulars, and, thus, eliminate disclosure disparities that
may discourage listing on a stock exchange. If the security is
to be listed on an exchange, the prospectus requirements are
fulfilled by the requirements of the Listing Particulars
Directive. If no such listing is required, the prospectus must
comply with the requirements of the Public Offer Prospectus
Directive. The directive, therefore, harmonizes the disclosure
standards for the offering of securities and marks the first step
toward a Community prospectus which could be used
interchangeably in all member states." 7
at 107-08; Interim Reports by Listed Companies, Explanation, 1 Common
Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 1745 (Aug. 30, 1983).
104 See Council Directive 89/298, 1989 O.J. (L 124) 8.
105 Notwithstanding the general requirement to publish a prospectus
before any public offering of securities, certain classes of securities or types
of offers are excluded. Furthermore, member states have the option to
exempt certain classes of securities from the prospectus requirement if
equivalent information is available to investors as a result of the stock
exchange disclosure requirements. For more details about these exemptio-
ns, see POSER, supra note 83, at 363-64; Reid & Ballheimer, supra note 27,
at 130; Commentary: Investor protection in public offer of shares (Directive
89/298), 1 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 1753, at 1393-16 (June 1990)
[hereinafter Investor Protection].
1 MSee supra note 95.
10 For a more detailed description of the Public Offer Prospectus
Directive see Reid & Ballheimer, supra note 27, at 129-32; Prospectus, supra
note 85, at 31-48; Harmonization, supra note 83, at 215-18; WYMEERCH,
supra note 25, at 14-16; HOFFMANN, supra note 85, at 108; POSER, supra
note 83, at 359-64; Investor Protection, supra note 105, 1753.Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
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4.1.6. Directives Conferring Mutual Recognition For
Listing Purposes And Prospectus Requirements
Originally, these stock exchange directives (the Admissions
Directive, the Listing Particulars Directive, and the Interim
Reports Directive) attempted to harmonize the listing
requirements throughout the Community so that a single
listing document would be recognized by all stock exchanges
within the Community. However, soon after their passage, it
became apparent that the harmonization effort would not be
successful. Accordingly, the Council limited the harmonization
attempt to two goals: mutual recognition of (i) listing
documents and (ii) offer prospectuses." 8
The Mutual Recognition Directive,' 9 adopted in 1987,
provides that listing particulars which are approved by a
competent authority in one member state must be recognized
in all other member states without further action or
information requirements.110  The Second Mutual
Recognition Directive,"' adopted in 1990, extends the
principle of mutual recognition to public offer prospectuses
which are used in the sale of listed securities in another
member state. If a public offer prospectus meets the standards
of the listing particulars and is approved in one member state
within the three preceding months, then other member states
are required to recognize the prospectus as a valid listing
particular." A proposed amendment to the Mutual
Recognition Directive"' extends mutual recognition to all
public offer prospectuses. Thus, mutual recognition would also
apply if the securities have not been previously listed on a
o See Reid & Ballheimer, supra note 27, at 127.
109 See Council Directive 87/345, 1987 O.J. (L 185) 81 (amending the
Listing Particulars Directive).
11 The listing particular, however, must be translated and additional
information specific to the markets of the member state which recognizes
the document must be included.
" Council Directive 90/211, 1990 O.J. (L 112) 24 (amending the Listing
Particulars Directive).
11. Again, the translation requirement and the requirement of in-
corporation of specific information relating to the markets of those other
member states must also be met in this case.
"S Eur. Parl. Doc. (COM 133) art. 24(b)(1) (1989).
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member state's exchange." 4
Mutual recognition, however, is not always required. If an
exemption or partial release from the requirements of the
listing particular or public offer prospectus has been granted
in one member state, mutual recognition is not required, if
such an exemption is not allowed in the member state in
which recognition is sought. Additionally, recognition is not
required if the conditions under which such an exemption has
been granted in one member state are not met in the other
member state. Therefore, issuers that seek listing on stock
exchanges in several member states should consider carefully
whether they want to qualify under an exemption or waiver.
If an issuer is from outside the Community, mutual
recognition may be granted on an optional basis. The
Community may agree with outside countries that listing
particulars drawn up and approved in accordance with the
rules of such outside countries may be recognized if two
conditions are met: (i) there must be reciprocity, and (ii) the
rules of the outside country must guarantee equivalent
investor protection.1" 5
4.1.7. The Insider Trading Directive
The Insider Trading Directive, which was adopted in 1989,
establishes the prohibition against insider trading throughout
the Community."' Until the Directive's adoption, national
laws on insider trading within the individual member states
was considerably disparate. Some member states had
legislation against insider trading, other member states had no
prohibition against insider trading at all, and Germany had
only self-regulatory rules under which market operators
agreed not to engage in insider trading."7  Thus, in
114 See Harmonization, supra note 83, at 214.
11" For a more detailed description of the Mutual Recognition Directives,
see HOFFMANN, supra note 85, at 108; POSER, supra note 83, at 362-63;
WYMEERCH, supra note 25, at 15; Reid & Baliheimer, supra note 27, at 127-
29; Harmonization, supra note 83, at 213-14,217-18; Prospectus, supra note
85, at 29-31, 46-49.
11 Council Directive 89/592, 1989 O.J. (L 334) 30.
17 For a comprehensive description of the various national regulations
on insider trading, see Christine A. McGuinness, Note, Toward the
Unification of European Capital Markets: The EEC's proposed Directive on
Insider Trading, 11 FORDHAM INT'L L. J. 432, 438-47 (1988); see also KLAUSPublished by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
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prohibiting insider trading through certain minimum
requirements,"' the Insider Trading Directive aims to
harmonize the various existing laws of the member states."'
The Insider Trading Directive defines "inside
information"' and prohibits insider trading for primary and
secondary insiders' 2 ' in "transferable securities." "1 2  The
directive does not specify sanctions for violations of its
prohibitions. Instead, it provides that sanctions must be
determined by the individual member states that enact the
directive into national law.2 ' Furthermore, the directive
J. HOPT, EUROPAIsCHEs UND DEUTSCHES INSIDERRECHT, ZEITSCHRIFT FOR
UNTERNEHMENS-UND GESELLSCHAFTSRECHT 17, 51-65 (1991) [hereinafter
INSIDERRECHT]; for an extensive collection of studies about insider trading
in Europe, see generally EUROPEAN INSIDER DEALING (Klaus J. Hopt & Eddy
Wymeerch eds., 1991). For a discussion of the variety of European insider
trading law and the developments which led to the adoption of the insider
trading directive, see THOMAS C. PAEFGEN, INSIDERHANDEL ZWISCHEN
GEMEINSCHAFTSRECHTLICHER INTEGRATION UND NATIONALSTAATLICHER
REGELUNG -E PLURIBUS UNUM, DIE AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT 380 (1991).
"1 See supra note 95.
119 For a more detailed description of the Insider Trading Directive see
Reid & Ballheimer, supra note 27, at 137-40 (describing both the insider
dealing directive and the sanctions for violation); Harmonization, supra note
83, at 219-21; WYMEERCH, supra note 25, at 23-24; HOFFMANN, supra note
85, at 109-10; Commentary: Control of Insider Dealing (Directive 89/592),
1 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 1 1763 (June 1990); POSER, supra note 83, at
353-57; BLOOMENTHAL & WOLFF, supra note 45, § 10.05[1]; Klaus J. Hopt,
The European Insider Dealing Directive, 27 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 51, 57-72
(1990); Insiderrecht, supra note 117, at 28-51. See generally Rafaello
Fornasier, The Directive on Insider Dealing, 13 FORDHAM INT'L L. J. 149,
149-77 (1990) (examining the provisions of the insider dealing directive from
conception, to passage, to planned implementation); McGuinness, supra note
117, at'432 (examining the individual nations' laws on insider trading and
analyzing the Community's directive).
... Inside information is defined in art. 1(1) as: "[ijnformation which has
not been made public of a precise nature relating to one or several issuers
of transferable securities,.., which, if it were made public, would be likely
to have a significant effect on the price of the transferable security or
securities in question." See Council Directive 89/592, supra note 116, at 31.
" A secondary insider is defined in art. 4 being one who knowingly
possesses inside information, the origin of which could only be a primary
insider. Thus, the Insider Trading Directive applies also to "tippees." Id.
at 31.
122 Under art. 1(2) such transferable securities include shares, debt
securities, futures, options and index contracts that are traded on an
organized market which is accessible to the public and regulated by
authorities. See id. at 31.
12 Article 13 only requires penalties that are 'sufficient to promote
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supplements the current reporting requirements set forth in
the Admissions Directive by requiring all companies whose
securities are traded on recognized markets to disclose
promptly any major developments which would likely have a
material effect on the price of securities."2'
4.1.8. Other Legislative Developments
Besides the above-mentioned legislative developments,
several other directives concerning the issuing and trading of
securities were adopted or proposed in recent years. Since
neither the Listing Particulars Directive, nor the Public Offer
compliance." See id. at 31. It remains unclear whether such penalties have
to be criminal or civil. Therefore, the member states may adopt different
penalties, thereby contributing to the lack of harmonization of insider
trading laws.
.24 See id. at 36. This disclosure requirement seems to be stronger than
comparable requirements in the United States, where companies are
permitted in certain cases to remain silent or take a "no comment" position
in case of merger negotiations and other early stages of transactions, see,
e.g., Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 239 n.17 (1988) (silence is
equivalent to no comment position and both are acceptable in defending
against a misleading statement). The directive provides however, that the
competent authority may relieve the issuer of this disclosure obligation if
the disclosure would prejudice the companies legitimate interests. For a
description of the extent of these disclosure requirements and the
interpretative questions which may arise, see POSER, supra note 83, at 356-
57.
The Insider Trading Directive differs in various other respects from the
regulation of insider trading in the United States. See McGuinness, supra
note 117, at 449-51. One of the most significant differences lies in the fact
that liability for insider trading in the United States traditionally required
a fiduciary relationship. See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 227-
28, 232 (1980) (duty to disclose arises when one has fiduciary duty to
another) and Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 653 (1983) (citing Chiarella and
noting the necessity of a fiduciary relationship for liability). The
Community directive however, does not require a fiduciary relationship and
instead adopts the "misappropriation theory." Compare Carpenter v. United
States, 484 U.S. 19, 27 (1987) (concept of fraud in an insider information
scheme includes "fraudulent appropriation of information") and United
States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 564 (2d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct.
1759 (1992) (distinguishing the application of the misappropriation theory
in Dirks and Chiarella and denying its application in case at bar which
involved familial relationships).
The second major difference lies in the fact that under the directive
insiders cannot be sued for damages by other holders of securities as
permitted under Rule 10b-5. The third major difference is that the United
States seems to have a great advantage over the Community in the area of
enforcement.
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Prospectus Directive apply to mutual funds, a Mutual Funds
directive 2 was adopted in 1985. It defines a separate
system for the recognition and marketing of mutual funds
throughout the Community. The Major Shareholder Directive,
which was adopted in 1988, requires the disclosure of
transactions involving significant holdings in listed
companies."' Furthermore, an amended proposal for a
Takeover Directive'27 was published in 1990. This directive
is designed principally to protect the shareholders of target
companies when faced with a takeover bid.
4.2. An Evaluation Of The Legislative Developments Of The
European Community
The many directives which have been adopted in recent
years have greatly harmonized the securities law throughout
the Community. Traditionally, securities regulation in Europe
has been described as "virtually nonexistent outside the
United Kingdom."'2 - The European stock exchanges are
organized under self-regulatory systems, and exist practically
without supervision by national governments. Most member
states did not have a system of full disclosure for the issuance
and trading of securities, and insider trading was not
prohibited in many member states. Once the member states
have fully implemented the directives into their respective
national bodies of law, a harmonized system of securities
regulations will exist throughout the Community. Based on a
mandatory disclosure philosophy, this regulatory system will
generally mandate higher disclosure standards than those
which have previously existed in the member states with the
goal of giving to the public fair, accurate, clear, adequate and
timely information. The directives achieve harmonization by
establishing both minimum standards for issuance of securities
and mutual recognition.
125 Council Directive 85/611, 1985 O.J. (L 375) 3, as amended by, Council
Directive 88/220, 1988 O.J. (L 100) 31.
126 Council Directive 88/627, 1988 O.J. (L 348) 62.
1 Commission Proposal 90C 240/09, 1990 O.J. (C 240) 7.
12. See Harmonization, supra 83, at 194-95 (citing an interview with
Professor L.C.B. Gower discussing the lack of regulation of securities
transactions outside the United Kingdom and the self-regulatory
characteristics of the other European stock exchanges).
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The overall goal of the harmonization efforts is to establish
an integrated securities market throughout the Community.
Both listing particulars and public offer prospectuses, which
are mutually recognized, facilitate the listing and public
offering of securities throughout the Community and lower the
related costs significantly. This, as well as raising public
confidence and heightening the analysis of corporate
disclosure, increases the attractiveness of the European
securities market. Therefore, this market may become more
competitive vis A vis other major capital markets, namely, the
U.S. market. Another goal of the harmonization efforts is the
promotion of greater competition in the financial services
sector, which would again reduce the costs of raising
capital."
Despite these goals, the harmonization efforts within the
Community have not been entirely successful. Under the 1992
harmonization deadline only minimum standards,
accompanied by mutual recognition, were established. Thus,
many regulations have the character of a compromise.
Commentators have stated that the Community chose
"harmony now" at the price of "discord later."30
Several factors contribute to the limitations of the
harmonization efforts. The minimum standard approach, for
instance, does not preclude certain member states from
imposing more stringent requirements when enacting the
directives in their national laws.3 ' Furthermore, many
directives provide several exceptions and exclusions.. 2 which
reduce both their scope and effectiveness. Moreover, although
directives themselves are binding on each member state,
member states can choose the form and method of
"" For a description of the benefits of the harmonization of the security
laws in the Community see Reid & Ballheimer, supra note 27, at 142-44
(noting that harmonization efforts may increase attractiveness to investors,
attract companies from the U.S. market, and promote cooperation amongthe
nations' financial sectors); Harmonization, supra note 83, at 224-29 (noting
the benefits resulting from increased regulation and harmonization to
include investor protection and better access to non-EC companies).
13, See Harmonization, supra note 83, at 231 (quoting THE ECONOMIST,
1992 Survey).
131 See supra note 95.
"" See supra note 105.
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implementation into national law,1" which creates another
limitation on harmonization goals. The sanctions for
violations of the insider trading prohibition, for example, are
determined by each member state according to the Insider
Trading Directive.M Further limitations on the harmonization
efforts result from some areas of the securities market which
still lack any regulation. Finally, the absence of an
institutional mechanism for the coordination and enforcement
of the new regulatory system reduces the chance of efficient
and effective harmonization."3 5 The enforcement efforts of
the national government authorities, therefore, will vary
greatly among the member states.'
On the other hand, several existing factors will strengthen
harmonization. Commentators suggest that once the directives
are implemented in the national legislation of the member
states, a larger class of "European corporations" which engage
in a multijurisdictional common securities market may
develop. These "European corporations" may develop a new
corporate psychology which would produce higher disclosure
levels.3 7 This may result from managements' desire to
develop a "world class image" or through the influence of third
party professionals whose services will be needed for operation
on an European level.' Commentators further suggest that
mutual recognition provided by the directives mandates
regulatory cooperation among the respective national
authorities. This cooperation, which will increase contact and
cooperation between those authorities, will likely lead to a
consensus among them about optimal disclosure levels."39
Furthermore, competition among member states may lead to
a "regulatory meltdown," that is, a deregulation down to the
minimum standards provided by the directives."4
'
3 See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
13 See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
135 See Harmonization, supra note 83, at 231 (suggesting the establish-
ment of an international securities commission).
1" For a description of the shortcomings of the Community's security
laws see Harmonization, supra note 83, at 229-32.
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It can be concluded that despite the differences between
the national regulations in the member states which will still
exist in the future, the Community's "will to harmonize has
produced an unprecedented convergence of disparate
regulatory standards.""' Indeed, "[n]o other bilateral or
multilateral international accords have approached this degree
of success.""' The Community has "established the world's
only multinational disclosure system.., and the first multi-
state prohibition of insider trading.""'  Indeed, the
Community is "the world's only multinational securities
regime ... ""' Accordingly, even if the degree of
harmonization achieved is incomplete, the achieved system
will be a significant step toward a single European securities
market that is capable of attracting more investors and issuers
than ever before.
4.3. Legislative Developments In Germany
4.3.1. The Present Regulation Of The Securities Markets In
Germany
As indicated above, the German securities market is
limited in size, but highly deregulated.'" The regulation of
the securities market in Germany gives a "diffuse and
confusing impression."!" The German securities market is
141 I& at 52.
4 Id. at 52-53.
'
4 See Harmonization, supra note 83, at 232.
1 Id. at 193.
141 See supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text. For further figures on
the size of the German securities market, see Feddersen & Skala-Kuhmann,
Germany, in INTERNATIONAL SECURITIES REGULATION 12-14 (Rosen ed.,
1991); R6hm, Germany, in INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL MARKETS AND
SECURITIES REGULATION 8C:19-22 (Bloomenthal ed., 1990); Gerhard Wegen,
Germany, in INTERNATIONAL SECURITIES LAW 127-28 (Euromoney ed. 1992)
[hereinafter Germany]; Claudius Dechamps, West Germany, INT'L FIN. L.
REV., July 1990 Supp., at 85 (Euromoney ed.); POSER, supra note 83, at 392-
93; for the newest available figures, see ANNUAL REPORT OF THE GERMAN
STOCK EXCHANGES 1992 (1992); for figures about the influence of
institutional investors in Germany see Thomas C. Paefgen, Institutional
Investors Ante Portas: A Comparative Analysis of an Emergent Force in
Corporate America and Germany, 26 INT'L LAW. 327, 328-31 (1992).
1' Eberhard Schwark, Regulation of the German Capital Markets -
Present Situation, Problems and Outlook, 1 J. COMP. CORP. L. & SEC. REG.
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regulated by a variety of statutes. No general statute
regulating issuance and trading of securities exists which
would be analogous to the U.S. Securities Act or the U.S.
Exchange Act. The legislation of the securities markets in
Germany is contained in the corporation law, in market-
related statutory rules, and in several self-regulatory rules
promulgated by the industry. 7  Furthermore, although a
federal securities supervisory agency will be established in the
upcoming legislative reform,' no such agency exists today.
Therefore, there is still a fragmentation of the organs of
control, which leads to certain loopholes in the supervision of
the market.'49
The German securities market consists of different market
segments. One principal distinction must be drawn between
the traditional stock exchange market and "off exchange
trading."
The trading on the three different segments of the stock
exchanges occurs under the regulation of the Stock Exchange
Act (the "Brsengesetz")."50  The three segments are the
official trading (the "Amtlicher Handel"), the regulated market
(the "Geregelter Markt") and the free market (the
"Freiverkehr").'5' Germany has eight regional stock
exchanges, located in Berlin, Bremen, Diisseldorf, Frankfurt,
299,299 (1978) [hereinafter German Capital Markets]. Although this article
is partly outdated, it still gives a thorough and accurate description of the
structure of the German securities market.
147 For a description of the German legal system in general see
Feddersen & Skala-Kuhmann, supra note 145, at 1-2. For a description of
the legal rules with respect to the German securities market, see German
Capital Markets, supra note 146, at 301-10;-R6hm, supra note 145, at 8C:19-
22, 8C:49-56; ASSMANN, supra note 3, at 11-12; Robert J. Dilworth,
Germany, Exemptions for Institutional Investors or Concepts on Non-Public
Offerings: A Comparative Study, 13 U. PA. J. INT'L BUS. L. 529, 530-31
(1993); for references on the regulation of legal entities versus the
regulation of the market see infra note 197.14 See infra notes 191-93 and accompanying text.
14, For a description of the existing organs of control, see Feddersen &
Skala-Kuhmann, supra note 145, at 8; R6hn, supra note 145, at 8C:6-8;
ASSMANN, supra note 3, at 12-14; Germany, supra note 145, at 128.
'" For a description of the regulations contained in the Stock Exchange
Act, see Rohm, supra note 145, at 8C:49-53; Feddersen & Skala-Kuhmann,
supra note 145, at 3-4 (description does not contain the reform of 1986).
"6 For a description of the three stock exchange segments, see Rohm,
supra note 145, at 8C:22-28; Dilworth, supra note 147, at 530-31.
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Hamburg, Hannover, Miinchen, and Stuttgart. After the
German reunification, plans were created to re-establish the
former stock exchange in Leipzig.15 Of all the regional
exchanges, Frankfurt is by far the most important.
Trading in securities outside the stock exchanges' is not
specifically regulated, even though several statutes, such as,
the Stock Corporation Act (the "Aktiengesetz") or the new
Offering Prospectus Law (the "Verkaufsprospektgesetz") may
apply to transactions occurring on this market. Trading on
this "off exchange market" primarily takes place among
institutional investors, such as banks, insurance companies,
and mutual funds. This trading includes the securities of
listed and unlisted corporations (including Eurobonds) and
Public limited partnerships (the "Publikumskommandit-
gesellschaften"). Other investment vehicles are also offered to
private investors (trading in securities and other investment
vehicles which are not admitted to a stock exchange market is
also called the "gray market"). Traditionally there was no
real marketplace for the "off exchange market"; instead,
special "door-to-door" sales forces marketed the securities.""
The recent development of electronic information and trading
systems, however, has created a market place for the securities
included in such systems.'55
The distribution of securities in Germany is subject to
different legislative regulations corresponding to the respective
markets on which a security is to be offered and traded. A
general duty to register securities similar to section 5 of the
U.S. Securities Act.. does not exist in Germany.
Traditionally, Germany did not even mandate a general duty
to publish and distribute a prospectus with the offering of a
security.
57
1.. Frankfurt - Former East German State Looks at Opening Exchange,
5 Int'l Sec. Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 10, at 8 (Apr. 21, 1992). However, it is
doubtful that these plans will be carried out in the foreseeable future.
" For a description of the different forms of "off exchange trading," see
VON RCJDIGER ROSEN, HANDBUCH DES KAPITALANLAGERECHTS 65-68
(Assmann & Schuitze eds., 1990).15 Feddersen & Skala-Kuhmann, supra note 145, at 9.
15 See infra notes 173-77 and accompanying text.
16 Securities Act of 1933, § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 77(f) (1988).
157 ASSMANN, supra note 3, at 192; Dilworth, supra note 147, at 531-32.
With the recent adoption of the Offering Prospectus Law
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Stocks or bonds issued by the more important corporations
are traded on one of the three segments of the stock exchange.
In order to be admitted to such an exchange, the issuer must
file an application with the intended stock exchange.
If the securities are to be listed on the Arntlicher Handel,
the first segment, the application must be filed with the
admissions board for the exchange and accompanied by both
a draft of the prospectus and supporting documents."' 8 The
listing requirements and the requirements for the prospectus
are set forth in the Borsengesetz, the Stock Exchange
Admission Regulation (the "Brsenzulassungs-Verordnung")
and in the rules and regulations of the particular stock
exchange where the listing is sought (the "Brsenordnung").
These requirements are primarily intended to protect the
investing public and ensure sufficient market liquidity.
If the securities are to be traded on the Geregelter Markt,
the second segment, the admissions requirements are less
restrictive in order to encourage smaller issuers to go public
and to facilitate the introduction of securities having a limited
turnover to stock exchange trading. An application for trading
on the regulated market must be filed with the admissions
committee. Instead of a prospectus, a business report, which
has significantly fewer requirements than the prospectus,
must accompany the application.
Trading on the Freiverkehr, the third official market
segment, is not governed by the Borsengesetz, but only by the
Bbrsenordnung of the respective stock exchange. In the
Frankfurt exchange, for instance, the decision to include a
security in the free market trading is made by the editorial
committee of the Association of Frankfurt Securities Dealers.
(Verkaufsprospektgesetz) such a duty was created for most of the publicly
traded securities (on or off exchange). However, many investment vehicles
of the "gray capital market" are not subject to the Act. On the other hand,
it should be noted that the courts in Germany created a civil liability for
misrepresentation in offering materials (Prospekthaftung) usedin connection
with interests in Public Limited Partnerships (Publikumskommandit-
gesellschaften). For a description of this liability, see ASSMANN, supra note
3, at 195-214.
1" Generally, foreign issuers can file these documents according to their
home countries' GAAP. Thus, documents which are established under the
U.S. GAAP are recognized under the Bbrsengesetz. This also applies for all
other filings which have to be made under the Stock Exchange Act
(Bbrsengesetz) or the Stock Corporation Act (Aktiengesetz).
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Here, the application does not require an accompanying
prospectus or business report. If a security is being offered for
the first time to the public, however, the
Verkaufsprospektgesetz requires the publication of a prospectus
when the security shall be traded on the Geregelter Markt or
the Freiverkehr.5 9
If shares of a stock corporation (a "Aktiengesellschaft") or
bonds are not to be traded on an exchange, the sale of such
securities may nevertheless be subject to certain regulations.
Under the Aktiengesetz, certain procedures are required to be
followed upon initiating the formation of a Aktiengesellschaft,
including the disclosure of specific information in order to
protect contributing shareholders. This information must be
filed in certain documents, such as the articles of incorporation
and financial statements, with the commercial register
administered by the local court."6 This court reviews only
if the filed documents are complete, and it does not express an
opinion as to the inherent risks of the corporation. After the
formation of such Aktiengesellschaft, its shares are freely
negotiable without further disclosure requirements. Since the
adoption of the Verkaufsprospektgesetz, on January 1, 1991,
however, a public offering of shares of a Aktiengesellschaft
which does not occur within the official trading of a stock
exchange must also comply with the prospectus requirements.
The issuance of bonds traditionally required the prior
approval of the Federal Minister of Finance. This requirement
was abolished with the adoption of the Verkaufsprospektgesetz.
Thus, today the issuance of bonds requires only the publication
of a prospectus that fulfills its prospectus requirements. 1 "
16 For a more detailed description of the admission of securities to one
of the three segments of exchange trading, see Rbhm, supra note 145, at
8C:67-75; Dechamps, supra note 145, at 86-88; Thomas Buhl & Wolfram
Fischer, Changes to Germany's Stock Exchange Act, INT'L FIN. L. REV., Mar.
1988, at 34; Freys & Zeller, Germany's New Capital Market Law, INT'L FIN.
L. REV., Oct. 1988, at 32 ; EBERHARD SCHWARK, DAS NEUE KAPITAL-
MARKTRECHT, NEuE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT 2041 (1987) [hereinafter
Kapitalmarktrecht]; FRANKFURT STOCK EXCHANGE, BASIC PRINCIPLES OF
ADMISSION OF SECURITIES TO STOCK EXCHANGE TRADING (1991); VON ROSEN,
supra note 153, at 53-62; Dilworth, supra note 147, at 533-35; Germany,
supra note 145, at 135-44.
1" For a description of the necessary filings upon formation of a stock
corporation, see Rdhm, supra 145, at 8C:66-67.
..1 For a description of public offerings of unlisted securities, see
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The Aktiengesetz, the Limited Liability Company Act (the
"Gesetz uber Gesellschaften mit beschrankter Haftung"), the
Commercial Code (the "Handelsgesetzbuch"), and the
Borsengesetz require continuous disclosure by companies
issuing stocks or bonds. Thus, these companies must publish
either annual or semiannual reports.1 2
The regulation of the securities markets in Germany still
does not contain a statutory prohibition on insider trading,
although such prohibition will be introduced in the upcoming
legislative reform." Today, insider trading is only
restricted by the Insider Trading Rules (the "Insiderhandels
Richtlinien, Handler- und Beraterregeln" and the
"Insiderverfahrens-ordnung") which were adopted by the stock
exchange expert commission. These rules are a voluntary set
of guidelines which German banks and most public companies
have agreed to observe. Violations of such guidelines are
investigated by a commission established at the exchange
where the purported violation has taken place.'
4.3.2. Recent Reforms Which Led To The Present
Regulation In Germany
The capitalization of German corporations has been a
continuing concern.1" One part of this problem was
attributable to the relatively unfavorable conditions of the
Dilworth, supra note 147, at 535-37.
12 For a description of the disclosure requirements under the different
statutes, see Rohm, supra note 145, at 8C:80-90; Germany, supra note 145,
at 134.
See infra notes 185-90 and accompanying text.
1 4 For a description of the voluntary Insider Trading Rules see Christof
V. Dryander, Germany, INT'L FIN. L. REV., Dec. 1991 Supp., at 9, 11; Rohm,
supra note 145, at 8C 111-17; Siegfried H. Elsing & Donna Shook-Wier-
cimok, New German insider trading regulations, INT'L FIN. L. REV., Oct.
1988, at 30; Feddersen & Skala-Kuhmann, supra note 145, at 23-24;
McGuinness, supra note 117, at 442-44; Hans-Bernd Schdfer & Claus Ott,
Economic Effects of EEC Insider Trading Regulation Applied to Germany,
12 INT'L REV. L. ECON. 357, 358-60 (1992); Carsten P. Claussen, Neues zur
kommenden Insidergesetzgebung (), 4 ZEITSCHRIFT FOR BANKRECHT UND
BANKWIRTsCHAFT 73, 75-76 (1992) [hereinafterlnsidergesetzgebungll; Klaus
J. Hopt, The German Insider Trading Guidelines - Spring-Gun or Scarecrow
?, 8 J. CoMP. Bus. & CAP. MARK. L. 381 (1986) [hereinafter Insider
Guidelines].
1" See supra notes 30-32 and accompanying text.
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German capital market. Among these unfavorable conditions
were the relatively high barriers to entry into the official
capital market and the high transaction costs on the German
stock exchanges. Moreover, the transaction costs were
accompanied by unfavorable tax conditions which provided for
preferential tax treatment of debt over equity financing and
imposed a stock transfer tax. Another concern was the
hostility of the German market regulation vis b vis new
financial instruments and new forms of trading, such as
electronic trading systems. A further disadvantage to
international competition was the regional structure of the
German stock exchanges which led to a lack of one central
market place."'
The 1986 Amendment to the Bbrsengesetz was the first step
in a series of reforms to keep Germany as a financial center
competitive among other financial markets. The 1986 reform
implemented several Community Directives" and created
a new market segment, the Geregelter Markt, which is today's
second segment of stock exchange trading. The introduction
of the Geregelter Markt was intended to facilitate equity
capital financing for small and medium-sized enterprises, for
which the new listing requirements seemed to be unduly
cumbersome.'"
Another important reform was the establishment of the
German financial futures exchange (the "Deutsche
Terminbarse" or the "DTB") which opened in January 1990.
Before the creation of the DTB, financial futures were traded
only to a very limited extent in Germany. This lack of trading
was due to restrictive laws and a strict interpretation of such
laws by the courts, under which futures contracts were not
enforceable.' At the DTB, the trading includes options on
16 See Buhl & Fischer, supra note 159; Kapitalmarktrecht, supra note
159; POSER, supra note 83, at 394-97.
167 These directives were the Admissions Directive (supra note 94), the
Listing Particulars Directive (supra note 97), and the Interim Reports
Directive (supra note 101).
16 For a description of the 1987 reform see Kapitalmarktrecht, supra
note 159; Buhl & Fischer, supra note 159; Freys & Zeller, supra note 159.
16 For details about the former legal situation concerning futures, see
EBERHARD SC..HWARK, NEUES RECHT FOR BORSENTERMIN-GESCHAFTE - DAs
GESETZ ZUR ANDERUNG DES BORSENGESETZES 1989, NEUE JuRIsTIscHE
WOCHENSCHRIFT 2675 (1989) [hereinafter Borsentermingeschafte].
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stocks, bonds, indexes, and financial futures based on bond
and share indices. In contrast to the previous trading system
at the exchanges, which occurred entirely on the exchange
floors, trading on the DTB is fully computerized. °
Therefore, access to the DTB is independent of the user's
location.'" In the first two years of its operation the trading
on the DTB has reached a considerable volume.'7 2
Another main area of reform of the German securities
markets was the introduction of new technology. Since 1987,
the Frankfurt Stock Exchange has operated a new price
quoting system (the "Kurs-Informations-Service-System" or the
"KISS") which quotes prices for stock, bonds, convertible
debentures, options, and warrants on a real time basis during
the trading time of the exchange. The KISS is only an
information system, not an electronic trading system. Since
January 1992, the Frankfurt Stock Exchange, in addition to
the KISS, has operated a new system called the Ticker Plant
Frankfurt (the "TPF'). This system is also a real time price
quotation system which includes the prices on the trading
floors of the Frankfurt Stock Exchange, the DTB and the Inter-
Bank-Information-System (the "IBIS"). Through introduction
ofpcKISS software, which can also be used in connection with
the IBIS, the TPF became available on-line for market
participants.
The IBIS was launched in December 1989. Originally, the
IBIS was only an information system, not a trading system.
After its successful operation, however, the IBIS was
1 7 Schwark has characterized the authorization of computerized trading
as opposed to traditional floor trading, as "revolutionary." Id. at 2676.
17' For a more detailed description of the DTB, see B6rsenterminge-
schafte, supra note 169; Friedrich Hey, Establishing the German Financial
Futures Exchange, INT'L FIN. L. REV., Aug. 1989, at 22; R6hm, supra note
145, at 8C: 34-41; ANNuAL REPORT OF THE FEDERATION OF GERMAN STOCK
EXCHANGES 1990, 34-35, 92-93 (1990).
' The volume of futures traded on the DTB made it the leading futures
exchange in Europe, see ANNUAL REPORT OF THE GERMAN STOCK
EXCHANGES 1992, 38, 54 (1992). However, a great part of the trading
volume is due to market making activities; therefore, the success of the DTB
is actually lower than initially expected.
"" For a description of KISS and TPF, see ANNUAL REPORT OF THE
GERMAN STOCK EXCHANGES 1992, supra note 172, at 90-94; ANNUAL REPORT
OF THE FEDERATION OF THE GERMAN STOCK EXCHANGES 1991, 37 (1991);
R61hn, supra note 145, at 8C:61.
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transformed in April 1991 into a trading system. The IBIS is
integrated in the Frankfurt Stock Exchange and includes the
30 stocks listed on the Deutscher Aktienindex (the "DAX'),74
as well as a number of widely traded bonds issued by public
authorities. The IBIS is designed primarily for use by
institutional investors, such as banks, insurance companies,
and investment funds. Although the IBIS is linked to the
Frankfurt Stock Exchange,"' members of the IBIS can also
be members of other stock exchanges. It is also possible to be
a member only of the IBIS trading system without being a
member of one of the German stock exchanges. Thus, the IBIS
is a separate trading system (operating as a market-maker
system), which currently operates in competition with the
traditional floor trading (operating as an auction system).
Some market participants, therefore, fear that computerized
exchanges like the IBIS may lead to the closing of the
exchanges' trading floors.'76  This occurred at the
International Stock Exchange in London. For this reason the
official brokers (the "Kursmakler") of the stock exchange
promoted a more limited information system: the Makler-Tele-
Informations-System (the "MATIS"). However, the MATIS was
discontinued in 1992 because it could not successfully compete
with the IBIS.' The upcoming reform 7  of the
174 The DAX is a market performance indicator comparable to the Dow
Jones Industrial Average.
' ' Floor trading of the Frankfurt stock exchange and IBIS are both
subject to the same regulatory regime. The official brokers (Kursmakler) are
required to take the market developments in IBIS into consideration when
determining prices of securities. Prices of transactions effected through
IBIS which are affected by Kursmakler are also official prices, i.e., prices
determined according to the rules of the Amtlicher Handel. See ANNUAL
REPORT OF THE FEDERATION OF THE GERMAN STOCK EXCHANGES 1991, supra
note 173, at 74.
"" For a description of IBIS, see ANNUAL REPORT OF THE GERMAN STOCK
EXCHANGES 1992, supra note 172, at 86-89; ANNUAL REPORT OF THE
FEDERATION OF THE GERMAN STOCK EXCHANGES 1991, supra note 173, at 35-
36, 74-76; ANNUAL REPORT OF THE FEDERATION OF GERMAN STOCK
EXCHANGES 1990, supra note 171, at 78-79; Rohm, supra note 145, at 8C:23-
25; POSER, supra note 83, at 399-400; IBIS Trading System Launched,
Securities Market Faces Change, 4 INT'L SEC. REG. REP. (BNA) No. 10, 4
(Apr. 22, 1991); In the last quarter of 1992, 27.4% of the DAX listed stocks
were traded through IBIS and in December 1992, 11.6% of the public sector
bonds were traded through IBIS--see ANNUAL REPORT OF THE GERMAN
STOCK EXCHANGES 1992, supra note 172, at 34, 86, 88.
17 See FINANCIAL MARKETS - BEGGAR THY COLLEAGUE, GERMAN BRIEF
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Bbrsengesetz will provide the legal framework under which
computerized stock exchange trading and face-to-face floor
trading can compete under equal conditions.
Traditionally, the German system of regional stock
exchanges was designed to develop the surrounding
geographical regions and to permit the introduction of small
and medium-sized enterprises to the organized capital market.
Although these goals are still valid, the internationalization of
the German capital market created the need for a strong
centralized major stock exchange.' Therefore, the
Frankfurt Stock Exchange had already changed its legal status
in preparation for its expanding role at the end of 1990. Its
organization was transformed from a statutory body under the
responsibility of the chamber of industry and commerce into an
Aktiengesellschaft which is held by banks and brokers 80 In
December 1992, the Frankfurt Stock Exchange Corporation
was transformed into a new holding company, the Deutsche
Borse AG, which operates the Frankfurt Stock Exchange, the
DTB, the clearing and settlement agency for German securities
(the "Deutscher Kassenverein"), and the exchange data
processing center (the "Deutsche Wertpapierdatenzentrale").
The new holding company is held by the regional stock
exchanges (ten percent), the official brokers (ten percent), and
by German and foreign banks (eighty percent).' This
creation of a main marketplace, which has the necessary size
and which is able to perform the necessary services to attract
large foreign and domestic investors, is a major step forward
in the development of Germany as a financial center. The
21 (1992); Frankfurt - MATIS Electronic System Terminated, 5 INT'L SEC.
REG. REP. (BNA) No. 21, 7 (Oct. 6, 1992).
178 See infra note 184 and accompanying text.
178 Gerhard Wegen, Towards a German Financial Center, INT'L FIN. L.
REV., Mar. 1992, at 10 [hereinafter Financial Center].
180 See ANNUAL REPORT OF THE FEDERATION OF THE GERMAN STOCK
EXCHANGES 1990, supra note 171, at 40.181 See ANNUAL REPORT OF THE GERMAN STOCK EXCHANGES 1992, supra
note 172, at 40-42; Klaus Westrick, Finanzplatz Deutschland Slowly Takes
Shape, INT'L FIN. L. REV., Nov. 1992, at 30, 31-32; Proposal to Integrate
Exchanges Approved -Frankfurt Takes Lead as Financial Center, 5 Int'l Sec.
Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 22, at 1 (Oct. 20, 1992); Exchange Merger Marks
'Milestone'In Frankfurt's Financial Evolution, 6 Int'l Sec. Reg. Rep. (BNA)
No. 3, at 1 (Jan. 12, 1993); Gerhard Wegen, Frankfurt Exchange to be
Holding Company, INT'L FIN. L. REV., Oct. 1992, at 43, 44.
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creation of the Deutsche Borse AG, however, is not
unanimously perceived as a positive development. Recently,
other market participants have criticized the strong influence
of the major German banks in the new holding company.
Another change in the German Securities Laws which is
designed to enhance competition in order to strengthen the
German financial market occurred on August 1, 1992. On that
date, the Bundesbank abandoned its requirement that
Eurobonds and Euronotes denominated in DM be listed on a
German Exchange and be subject to German law and domestic
settlement procedures. Furthermore, foreign institutions not
registered as banks can now issue DM debentures of less than
two years directly into the commercial paper market. As a
result, one can expect that in the future DM bonds will be
listed increasingly in London or Luxembourg.
The Bundesbank still requires that DM securities be issued
through a financial institution based in Germany. Under the
new regime, however, it is no longer necessary to use a
German bank or the German subsidiary of a foreign bank.
German branches of foreign institutions may also be lead
managers for DM bonds, provided that they have a listing
department which is able to perform the role of such lead
manager. The Bundesbank also still requires that: (i) it be
notified of DM-denominated foreign issues on the day of their
issue, and (ii) new instruments, including DM-denominated
components, be submitted in sufficient time so that it may
express its opinion thereof prior to the issue. 82
Until recently, two different taxes disadvantaged the
issuance and the trading of securities in Germany. The
corporation tax (the "Gesellschaftssteuer") had to be paid on
the purchase price of equity securities by the first buyer. The
stock exchange turnover tax (the "Bdrsenumsatzsteuer") was a
transfer tax which had to be paid on the subsequent trading of
equity securities and bonds. Both of these taxes were recently
abolished."es The Birsenumsatzsteuer in January 1991 and
"' For a description of the new Bundesbank Guidelines see Ulrich Koch,
New Guidelines for DM-Denominated Bonds, INT'L FIN. L. REV., Aug. 1992,
at 45; Euro-DM Wins Credibility, EUROMONEY, Dec. 1992, at 80; ANNUAL
REPORT OF THE GERMAN STOCK EXCHANGES 1992, supra note 172, at 37.
1' See R6hm, supra note 145, at 8C:62; Dechamps, supra note 145, at 88;
Germany, supra note 145, at 146-47. One tax provision which is still in
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the Gesellschaftssteuer in January 1992.
4.3.3. Upcoming Reforms Of The German Securities
Legislation
The upcoming reforms of the German Securities Legislation
will again be inspired on one hand by the Communities'
harmonization efforts (i.e., the transformation of Communities'
directives into the German law) and, on the other hand, by
further movements to make the German capital market more
competitive in the international arena. To achieve these goals
a so-called "German Financial Center Act" (the "Finanzplatz
Deutschland Gesetz") is currently being drafted by the Federal
Ministry of Finance and will be voted on by the German
Parliament, the Bundestag, by the end of 1993.1" The new
legislative draft will principally address the development of
sufficient market supervision to ensure the element of
"honesty" in the market. The legislative reform will consist of
a new Securities Trading Act (Wertpapierhandelsgesetz), and
a law amending the Borsengesetz.
Traditionally, the German securities markets have
operated under a system of essentially unsupervised self-
regulation.1" This voluntary regulatory system was strongly
favored over statutory regulation of insider trading and the
establishment of a central supervisory agency. 8
force and disadvantages foreign investors concerns the taxation of
distributed profits of stock corporations. Because German stock
corporations are subject to a corporate income tax and a capital yield tax,
shareholders retain only 48% of their dividends in cash. Domestic
shareholders, however, are allowed tax credits imputable towards their
other income tax liability. See Dechamps, supra note 145, at 8C:62;
Germany, supra note 145, 146-47.
1" For a description see Germany, supra note 145, at 129-32; Financial
Center, supra note 179; Westrick, supra note 181; Finance Ministry Releases
Plans to Revamp Securities Laws, Exchanges Reach Agreement, 5 Int'l See.
Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 4, at 1 (Jan. 28, 1992); Financial Powerhouse Starts to
Take Shape, EUROMONEY, Dec. 1992, at 74; ANNUAL REPORT OF THE GERMAN
STOCK EXCHANGEs 1992, supra note 172, at 94-99. The first draft was
published for comments on July 12, 1993. A revised draft will be discussed
in the German parliament in the upcoming months. The new law will be
voted on by the end of 1993 or the beginning of 1994. It will become
effective July 1, 1994.
185 See notes 163-64 and accompanying text.
18 Insidergesetzgebung I, supra note 164, at 76-78 (summarizing
arguments pro and con concerning the self-regulatory system).
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Nevertheless, international competition, a series of recent
scandals,"7 and the necessary adoption of the Community's
Insider Trading Directive'" have led to a new approach in
Germany.' The new legislative draft will include a
prohibition against insider trading and will create a
supervisory authority." °
In a working paper dated January 25, 1993, a committee of
representatives of the German states and the Federal Ministry
of Finance presented, on agreement, the establishment of a
federal supervisory authority for Germany's securities market.
This supervisory authority will be comparable to the SEC. 9 '
Such agreement was necessary in order to adopt the proposed
legislation reforming the German securities market.
The agreement provides for the creation of a federal
supervisory authority, Bundesamt far das Wertpapierwesen,
which will administer: (i) the insider-dealing provisions to be
introduced by the new Wertpapierhandelsgesetz adopting the
EC Insider Dealing Directive into national law; (ii) the new
rules designed to encourage disclosure and transparency on
the German equity markets (companies will have to disclose
187 See ANNUAL REPORT OF THE FEDERATION OF THE GERMAN STOCK
EXCHANGES 1991, supra note 173, at 13, 42-44; Rdhm, supra note 145, at
8C:116; Schafer & Ott, supra note 164, at 360-62; Richard C. Morais, Insider
Auf Deutsch, FORBES, Nov. 9, 1992, at 88; see also Insider Guidelines, supra
note 164, at 391-92 (describing less current insider trading scandals).
'" For a discussion of the upcoming questions with respect to the
transformation of the EC-Insider Directive into German legislation, see
Carsten P. Claussen, Neues zur kommenden Insidergesetzgebung (II), 4
ZEITSCHRIFT FOR BANKRECHT UND BANKWIRTsCHAFT 267, 282-83 (1992)
[hereinafter Insidergesetzgebung II]; WOLFGANG GRUNDMANN, NEUREGELU-
NG DES INSIDERHANDELS-VERBOTS IN DEUTSCHLAND, ZEITSCHRIFT FOR DAS
GESAMTE KREDITWESEN 12 (1992); MARTIN SCHODERMEIER & EDGAR
WALLACH, DIE INSIDER-RICHTLINIE DER EUROPAISCHEN GEMEINSCHAFT,
EUROPAISCHE ZEITSCHRIFT FOR WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT 122 (1990).
18 See ANNUAL REPORT OF THE FEDERATION OF THE GERMAN STOCK
EXCHANGES 1991, supra note 173, at 101; Financial Center, supra note 179;
Finance Ministry Releases Plans to Revamp Securities Laws, Exchanges
Reach Agreement, supra note 184, at 8.
'" For a description of the first proposal outlining the framework which
was translated into the first draft of the legislative proposal see Penalties
and Definitions Framework Clears Path for Insider 7rading Bill, 6 Int'l Sec.
Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 6, at 1 (Feb. 23, 1993).
' See Progress Made on "Insider" Law - Central Watchdog Created, 6
Int'l Sec. Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 4, 1 (Jan. 26, 1993); ANNuAL REPORT OF THE
GERMAN STOCK EXCHANGES 1992, supra note 168, at 96-98.
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stakes in other companies if they reach a certain threshold the
present threshold of twenty-five percent will be reduced to a
threshold between five percent and ten percent); and (iii) a set
of "rules of conduct" for market participants which will be
introduced in anticipation of the EC Investment Services
Directive. The new Bundesamt far das Wertpapierwesen will
also represent the Federal Republic to foreign supervisory
authorities, such as, the SEC.'
The jurisdiction of the new Bundesamt will be coordinated
with the several existing organs of control. The German states
will remain responsible for supervision of the stock exchanges,
the official brokers, and, to the extent it is not already covered
by the supervisory authority's surveillance, the trading on the
exchanges. The new law will provide for a close cooperation
between the federal supervisory authority and the states. In
order to facilitate such cooperation, the Bdrsengesetz will
create a securities council (the "Wertpapierrat"), which will
consist of representatives from all states. The Wertpapierrat
will represent the interests of the states to the supervisory
authority. Although the Wertpapierrat may advise, it will lack
the authority to implement policies.
The legislative reform will also change the organization of
the stock exchanges. The stock exchanges will retain
jurisdiction over the adoption of rules and regulations
governing their activities. In addition, they will retain
competence over the admission of market participants and over
the admission of securities for trading on the exchange. The
stock exchanges, however, will be required to establish a
supervisory department in order to monitor trading activities
and determine any irregularities. If irregularities are
discovered by the supervisory department, any investigation
will be carried out by the federal supervisory authority.
The new Borsengesetz will also change the management
structure of the stock exchanges. The exchange's current
board of governors (the "Bdrsenvorstand") will be replaced by
19 For a discussion of the structure, the objective, and the jurisdiction
a future supervisory authority should have, see Insidergesetzgebung I, supra
note 164; Siegfried Ktimpel, Zur Neugestaltung der staatlichen B~rsenauf-
sicht - von derRechtsaufsicht zur Marktaufsicht-, 46 WERTPAPIERMITTEILUN-
GEN 381 (1992); RODIGER VON ROSEN, INTERNATIONALE ANFORDERUNGEN AN
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an exchange council (the "Bbrsenrat") designed to represent all
market participants. A board of management will exercise the
managerial functions of the current board of governors and the
exchange council will exercise supervisory functions. Only half
of the seats on the exchange council will be held by
representatives of the banks and only four of the nine banking
representatives will be appointed by major banks. The other
banking representatives will be appointed by local banks,
private banks, and thrifts.
4.3.4. Evaluation Of The Legislative Developments In
Germany
Traditionally, different national securities markets in
Europe, which were organized under various regulatory
systems, faced only limited competition from one another.
Through the opening of national markets in accordance with
the Community's efforts to create a common securities market,
the competition in Europe has increased. This development
was fostered by the worldwide internationalization of the
capital markets. Germany, with one of the least regulated
systems in Europe, initially did not feel a need to reform its
legislation on capital markets.19 However, other member
states' willingness to reform pressured Germany into
considering reforms to increase the competitiveness of its
securities market. Thus, the reform in Germany, which had
been slow at the outset, has progressed remarkably in recent
years. In fact, the reform process in Germany is advancing on
a continuous basis. In the last years, the Borsengesetz and
other statutes were amended several times to transform
European directives into national law as well as to introduce
changes on a national level.
193 Poser argues:
The extent to which a particular country has decided to reform its
securities market has depended on several factors, including its
legal system and traditions, the structure of its market, and the
degree of the competitive pressures felt. For example, the
willingness shown in France to move ... 'from being one of the
most highly regulated markets in Europe to one of the most
deregulated' contrasts sharply with the resistance to change
manifested... in Germany.
POSER, supra note 83, at 378.
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The limited size of the German capital market required the
development of a new legal framework which would meet
international standards and attract investors. This new
framework has evolved with subsequent changes occurring on
several levels. The first is the harmonization of the German
system with the systems of other member states. The second
is the recent replacement of the traditionally regional
organization of the stock exchanges with one centralized stock
exchange which will be competitive on an international level.
The third is the creation of sufficient protection for investing
market participants against manipulation .and fraud in the
market place. The fourth is the adaptation of the market
place to new technologies and their integration into the
existing regulatory system.
In addition to the creation of a framework for a modern
and international market place, existing impediments to an
efficient securities market had to be abolished. Although some
deregulatory measures have already been adopted, additional
measures are needed. One example of such deregulation is the
abolishment of the transfer tax on the trading of securities.
Deregulation is also appropriate in the area of the admission
of new financial instruments by the legislator.
The reform process, despite its relatively late beginning,
has already had a positive impact on the market. One
observer stated: "Slowly and painfully, West Germany's stock
market is being hauled into the 20th century."' 14  The
creation of the above-mentioned framework, as well as some
further deregulation, is forthcoming. The market participants
and the legislators in Germany are aware of the necessity for
further reforms. The adoption of the new "German Financial
Center Act"'95 will be a major step forward. Recent German
legislation tends to integrate the regulation of legal entities
and the regulation of the market.' Even though it seems
194 I& at 394.
, See supra note 184 and accompanying text.
1" See German Capital Markets, supra note 146, at 310-11 (discussing
different approaches of regulation and their relation); see also Stefan
Grundmann, DeutschesAnlegerschutzrecht in internationalen Sachverhalten,
54 RABELSZ 283, 285-87, 321 (1990); Kiimpel, supra note 192, at 384. For
a detailed discussion of the two different approaches and the need for their
integration, see Klaus J. Hopt, Vom Aktien- und Bcirsenrecht zum Kapital-
marktrecht?, 140 ZEITSCHRIFT FOR UNTERNEHMENS- UND GESELLSCHAFTSRE-
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that the reaction of market participants and the legislators is
leading toward a successful reform of the German market,
many issues must still be resolved. Major elements of the
reform will be adopted through the proposed "German
Financial Center Act." The successful creation of this proposed
law will determine whether German legislation can catch up
with the developments that have taken place in the last few
years. The success of reform will further depend on the
proposed establishment of the Bundesamt fMr das
Wertpapierwesen, and on the seriousness with which it will
exercise its regulatory authority.
5. CONCLUSION AND OUTLOOK
5.1. The Different Approaches To Reform, Reasons And
Evaluation
The reforms adopted in the United States in response to
the internationalization of the capital markets were entirely
deregulatory in nature. Comparable reforms in Europe,
however, were both deregulatory and regulatory in nature.
The terms "deregulation" and "regulation" cover multiple
concepts, and the use of these terms is not uniform.
Deregulation often refers to the removal of restraints on
competition. These restraints, also known as "access
regulations," usually consist of economic regulations which
restrict either access to markets or activities performed by
market participants.' This type of deregulation must be
distinguished from "prudential deregulation" which is the
removal of rules serving the goal of investor protection. 9
In this Article, "deregulation" refers to both types of
deregulation.
In recent years, deregulation of the capital markets in the
United States was mainly prudential deregulation. The
description in Section 3 pointed out that the regulation of the
U.S. securities market, which was intended to ensure the
CHT 201 (1976), 141 ZEITSCHRIFT FOR UNTERNEHMENS- UND GESELLSCHAFTS-
RECHT, 389 (1977).
197 See Harmonization, supra note 83, at 187; POSER, supra note 83, at
1-2.
1,8 Id
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highest level of protection, brought about the opposite effect in
certain cases. U.S. securities laws imposed such a significant
burden upon foreign investors that the U.S. market became
highly unattractive. In other cases the strong investor
protection resulted even in disadvantaging U.S. investors in
relation to foreign investors.199 Thus, the United States had
to lower investor protection standards with respect to foreign
issuers in order to reduce transaction costs to the levels in
foreign countries.
U.S. reforms addressed these difficulties in three different
ways.2" First, the reforms modified foreign issuers' disclosure
obligations for registration and reporting in order to ease
compliance with U.S. securities laws2 ' Second, the U.S.
reforms created rules (the MJDS, the proposed regulation of
cross-border rights, tender, and exchange offers) to recognize
disclosure documents drafted under foreign laws. 0 2 Third,
the reforms placed limits on the application of section 5 of the
Securities Act (Regulation S and Rule 144A).'O
It is true that the third type of reform, while favoring off-
shore distributions by U.S. issuers and attracting foreign
investors to the private placement market, does not encourage
participation in the public market.2 ' Nonetheless, the mere
limitation on the application of section 5 of the Securities Act
lowers investor protection standards much less than an
extension of reciprocal recognition; thereby the SEC is, in fact,
adapting the U.S. system to the needs of globalized markets
one step at a time. Thus, an increased recognition of foreign
documents, i.e., an extension of the MJDS, which would
further transform the U.S. system, seems unlikely in the near
future. After all, a system of full recognition of foreign
disclosure documents may eventually lead to the unequal
treatment of U.S. and foreign issuers." The enactment of
1 " See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
2" See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
201 See supra notes 38-41 and accompanying text.
202 See supra notes 42-53 and accompanying text.
203 See supra notes 54-72 and accompanying text.
204 See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
205 See Cox ET AL., supra note 4, at 328 (calling this threat of unequal
treatment a "regulatory dilemma" for the SEC).
Many of the disclosure requirements the Commission imposes on
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Regulation S and Rule 144A have already been very effective
in achieving their specific objectives without leading to
unequal treatment of U.S. and foreign issuers.2"
The deregulation in Europe consisted mainly of access
deregulation, followed by a series of subsequent regulations to
address the perceived shortcomings of regulatory systems after
such deregulation. Simultaneous regulation and deregulation
of a market is not inconsistent. In fact, deregulation often
leads to further regulation.2 °" The Community's member
states, to achieve access deregulation, had to abolish all
restrictions on the movement of capital between residents of
the Community.2°  However, as the member states of the
Community lacked securities laws comparable to those of the
United States,"° the opening of the market necessitated the
introduction of new regulatory measures.
The attempted harmonization in the Community has led
only to a moderately harmonized system of securities
regulation.210 Its shortcomings were caused by the approach
taken--attempting harmonization through the establishment
of minimum standards as opposed to through the unification
of legislative standards. One has to bear in mind, however,
that even the limited harmonization attained within the
Community is unique to the world.2" Besides, future reforms
will reduce existing disparities over time. For example, the
establishment of a European Securities Commission,
recommended by certain commentators,2" although unlikely
domestic issuers are burdensome and many of these requirements
are not imposed on foreign issuers. Furthermore, a fundamental
objective of the Commission's basic information package is
comparability among issuers; this objective is seriously
compromised when an important segment of issuers, i.e., foreign





M See supra note 73.
", See Harmonization, supra note 83, at 188-89; POSER, supra note 83,
at 1.
208 See supra notes 92-93 and accompanying text.
209 See supra note 128 and accompanying text.
210 See supra notes 130-36 and accompanying text.
211 See supra notes 141-44 and accompanying text.
112 See Harmonization, supra note 83, at 231.
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to occur in the near future, would be a major breakthrough in
the unification of the European system.
5.2. Future Developments - Outlook
The reforms in the United States and in the member states
of the Community have narrowed the gap among the different
systems. Thus, a mutual recognition of foreign disclosure
standards seems to be more likely now than it was a decade
ago. The increased levels of disclosure generally required in
the member states of the Community already make it easier
for European issuers to satisfy the regulatory requirements of
the U.S. system.213 Furthermore, disclosure documents of
U.S. issuers will almost always be recognized in the
Community.
214
In fact, negotiations about a possible mutual recognition of
disclosure standards between the Community and the United
States are forthcoming. The Commission of the European
Community and the SEC signed a cooperation agreement
during the assembly of the International Organization of
Securities Commissions in September 1991.2"' The Federation
of the German Stock Exchanges created a committee which
works in close contact with the New York Stock Exchange.
2 1 6
Even if these negotiations do not lead to an agreement in the
near future, they indicate a change in attitudes among the
respective national securities agencies.
In addition, the increased level of disclosure requirements
in Europe may also lead to a change in attitudes among a
number of market participants. The recent example of the
Daimler Benz AG illustrates this point. Daimler is the first
German company which has obtained a listing of its shares on
the New York Stock Exchange,2 1 7 demonstrating that the
U.S. marketplace seems to be attractive enough to induce
certain foreign companies to undergo the burdensome task of
218 See id. at 225.
214 See id. at 218 n.216; see also supra note 158.
215 See ANNUAL REPORT OF THE FEDERATION OF THE GERMAN STOCK
EXCHANGES 1991, supra note 173, at 91.
" e id. at 92; Frankfurt - NYSE, German Officials Discuss Listings,
5 Int'l Sec. Reg. Rep. (BNA) No 7, at 7 (Mar. 10, 1992).
217 See supra note 20.
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reconciling their financials in accordance with U.S. accounting
standards.2 1 The lower the differences among the disclosure
levels in different countries, the less burdensome it is for a
company to fulfill the higher disclosure standards of a foreign
country.
The member states of the Community have also discussed
additional projects with respect to the globalization of the
markets. The Federation of Stock Exchanges in the EC has
worked to create Eurolist, a special market segment which is
to be created on all member stock exchanges and which shall
contain European "blue chips." Eurolist will eliminate some
procedural requirements for issuers in order to achieve
multiple admission to Europe's various stock exchanges, all of
which have their differing conditions and administrative
demands. Admission to Eurolist shall entail a simultaneous
admission on the Eurolist segments of all member stock
exchanges, provided the corporation is admitted to the official
market of its own national stock exchange.21 A related
project deals with the establishment of a European stock
index.220
From a summary of the legislative developments which
have taken place in the different markets, one can observe:
(i) a deregulation of the securities regulation in the United
States which is based on harmonization as well as on
recognition of foreign systems, and (ii) a harmonization of the
legal systems in the European Community, which is based on
2" For a discussion of the reconciliation requirements necessary to adapt
financials of foreign companies to U.S. GAAP, see James R. Doty, The Role
of the Securities and Exchange Commission in an Internationalized
Marketplace, 60 FoRDHAM L. REV., May 1992, at S77, S88-89.
For a description of the reconciliation of financial statements required
of foreign issuers entering the U.S. securities markets, see SEC DMSION OF
CORPORATE FINANCE, SURVEY OF FINANCIAL STATEMENT RECONCILIATIONS
BY FOREIGN REGISTRANTS (May 1, 1993) (copies may be obtained from the
corporation's public reference room).
... Eurolist will be restricted to European "blue chips" with a market
capitalization of at least ECU I billion and an annual turnover of at least
ECU 250 million. The issuer must seek at least admission at four European
stock exchanges in addition to its national stock exchange. For a description
of Eurolist, see ANNUAL REPORT OF THE FEDERATION OF THE GERMAN STOCK
EXCHANGES 1991, supra note 173, at 85; ANNUAL REPORT OF THE GERMAN
STOCK EXCHANGES 1992, supra note 1, at 102.
220 See ANNUAL REPORT OF THE FEDERATION OF THE GERMAN STOCK
EXCHANGES 1990, supra note 171, at 97.
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the establishment of minimum standards and the recognition
of other member states' systems.22'
However, further global harmonization of the securities
laws beyond the scope of current undertakings within the EC
seems unlikely in the foreseeable future. Even though some
improvement in the assimilation of the different systems may
occur in specific areas, the differences of the national systems,
based on different historical experiences which have produced
different "cultures of regulation," (i.e., different goals of the
national regulators, severely limit further harmonization on a
larger scale). Other impediments to such legislative
harmonization include: (i) a variety of regulators with often
overlapping authorities in some jurisdictions, or the complete
lack of a central regulator in other jurisdictions; (ii) the speed
with which financial innovations are created;2 and (iii) the
different character of market participants across the various
jurisdictions.22
A higher level of harmonization seems possible only
through further deregulation."M The developments towards
a single European securities market will enhance competition
221 For a discussion of the conflicting principals in the harmonization
efforts of the European Community, see Klaus J. Hopt, Legal Harmonization
on the Way to Europe 1992: Banking and Capital Markets, 4 BANKING &
FIN. L. REV. 309, 310-15 (1990).
222 Many of the new financial innovations are created in reaction to
regulations within a specific system. Therefore, financial innovations may
be very successful in one regulatory system, but may not have the same
success in other systems. The former chairman of the SEC, Richard C.
Breeden summarized the problem, stating: "The market is well ahead of the
regulators." See KLAUS BOHLHOFF, KRITERIEN UND METHODEN EINER
REGULIERUNG DER INTERNATIONALEN KAPITAL- uND WERTPAPIERMARKTE,
FESTSCHRIFT FOR HEINSIUS 49, 50 (1991).
2"3 Examples of different characters are the separation ofinvestment and
commercial banking in the United States and the concept of universal
banking in other countries, and the different objectives and authorities of
the national banks in various countries.
For a description of the different impediments of a further
harmonization of securities laws, see BOHLHOFF, supra note 222, at 49, 54;
Van Zandt, supra note 1, at 72-74.
224 For a discussion of deregulation in order to achieve a further
harmonization of the regulatory systems, see BOBLHOFF, supra note 222;
Markus Lusser, Internationale Harmonisierung von Bankrecht und
Finanzmarktaufsicht: Ziele und Probleme, 1 ZEITSCHRIFT FOR BANKRECHT
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with other major markets like the United States, which in
turn will compel further liberalization of regulations."2 5
Although some commentators have expressed the fear of a
"race to the bottom," '" further deregulation seems to be the
only efficient way to achieve a higher degree of uniformity
among different legislative systems. Commentators do agree,
however, that some minimum standards of regulation are
necessary to ensure "honesty" in the market, although they
may not agree on a general definition of such minimum
standards."27 With respect to achieving some agreement
about minimum standards and about the extent to which
deregulation and liberalization should take place, B6hlhoff
points in the right direction - it is not methods of regulation or
questions of competence which should be discussed in the first
place, but rather the extent to which regulation is necessary
at all.
228
Therefore, one can conclude that the competition among
various marketplaces should lead to further deregulation. If
regulators increase the level of cooperation, establishing
harmonized minimum standards of regulation of the securities
markets may be easier. The result of such developments may
be a further integration of regulatory systems, even though
2,. See Van Zandt, supra note 1, at 78.
2216 See Lusser, supra note 224, at 103.
227 The sophistication of investors is an important criterium to consider
when attempting to define those minimum standards. For example, Van
Zandt theorizes about the possible development of a "two-tiered structure"
of securities markets:
The first tier will be an off-shore international market with fewer
regulations that will approximate but be much larger than the
existing Eurosecurities market. The predominant participants will
be large, creditworthy, multinational borrowers from all countries
and sophisticated institutional investors. The second tier will be a
composite of highly regulated local or national markets in countries
with significant pools of capital ... in which start-up enterprises
and lower-rated borrowers raise capital and into which smaller
investors can put their discretionary investment capital at risk.
Van Zandt, supra note 1, at 79-80. B6hlhoff also seems to favor the two-tier
approach and states that Rule 144A is a step in the right direction. See
BOHLHOFF, supra note 222, at 57; see also supra note 63.
For a selection of articles about private placements in different
countries, see Albert S. Pergam, Exemptions for Institutional Investors or
Concepts of Non-Public Offerings: A Comparative Study, 13 U. PA. J. INTI'L
Bus. L. 473 (1993).1 ' See B1HLHOFF, supra note 222, at 49.
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complete harmonization seems to be very unlikely in the
foreseeable future.
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